Parikh: Justified True Belief

Justified True Belief: Plato, Gettier and Turing
Rohit Parikh (CUNY)
September 24, 2013, 2:00 PM,
Room 3209, CUNY GC
Abstract. We examine the relationship between the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge and Plato’s theory about it as expounded in the Theaetetus. Considering Socrates’ remarks in the Theaetetus brings us to some concerns raised by Turing and to Wittgenstein’s famous comment explanations come to an end somewhere. We present two simple technical results which bear on the question. And finally, we look at the pragmatic aspects of knowledge attributions.

Parikh: Epistemic logic, games and social software

Epistemic Logic, Games and Social Software: some old and new ideas
Rohit Parikh (CUNY)
September 19, 2013, 4:15 PM,
Room 9204/9205, CUNY GC
Abstract. epistemic reasoning has gradually matured from being the domain of philosophers and logicians to becoming relevant also in economics and social science. But theoretical computer science and game theory remain as two of the most powerful tools which epistemologists can wield. Epistemic tools have been used by writers as different from each other as Shakespeare, Shaw and O’Henry. Even the Indian epic Mahabharata contains stories whose main point is epistemic. But more recently there has been technical work devoted to what might be called applied epistemic logic, and CUNY has been one of the leaders. CUNY collaborators include Walter Dean, Cagil Tasdemir and Andreas Witzel. Eric Pacuit, who got his doctorate from CUNY some years ago, has now become a household word in epistemic circles. And Artemov’s own interest in Game theory has a very strong epistemic flavor. There are also very important questions about the extent to which epistemic considerations enter into animal behavior. Major figures like Peter Godfrey-Smith and Robert Lurz at CUNY have contributed to this field which began with some questions raised by Premack and Woodruff at U. Penn. We cannot possibly do justice to all this work in a single talk but will try to give a bird’s eye view and indicate one or two “cute” results.

Formal Epistemology Reading Group FA11 #7

The next meeting of the formal epistemology reading group will take place on Sunday (November 6) 6:00 pm in Room 720, Philosophy Hall. As suggested in Rush’s post beow, we shall continue to discuss S4 vs. S5. I shall provide a summary of the relevant part of Hintikka’s 1962 book, we can then discuss it.

  • Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions. Introduced by V. Hendricks and J. Symons, College Publications (2005)

Hope to see you all there!