CUNY SEMINAR IN LOGIC, PROBABILITY, AND GAMES
Topologic: old and new results
Konstantinos Georgatos (CUNY)
4:15 PM, Friday, March 21, 2014
Room 3305, CUNY GC
Abstract. In 1992, Moss and Parikh introduced Toplogic an epistemic modal logic whose semanticas are based on subsets. Since then, research on this logic and it many extensions has been going strong. I will survey most of these results in the first part of this talk. On the second part, I will present how topologic can form a basis for the formalization of belief change operators, such as update, conditionals and contraction. Arbitrary nestings and iterations of such operators are easily automatized which is not the case in other studies of belief change in object language.
NY/NJ PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE GROUP
Cosmology at the Crossroads
Anna Ijjas (Princeton)
4:10 – 6:00pm PM , March 3, 2014
201D Philosophy Hall, Columbia University
Abstract. Thirty years of inflation have greatly changed modern cosmological thinking. Most importantly, inflation provides a paradigm for the generation of primordial density fluctuations seeding the structure of our universe, by stretching quantum fluctuations to cosmological distances. However, the physics governing the evolution of the very early universe before nucleosynthesis remains a challenge for modern theoretical cosmology. In this talk, I will begin by reviewing inflationary cosmology and discussing the reasons why most cosmologists today consider it to be the leading paradigm. Then, I will turn to the flaws of inflationary thinking and present possible ways out.
CUNY SEMINAR IN LOGIC AND GAMES
Robert Stalnaker (MIT/Columbia)
4:15 – 6:15 PM, Friday, December 6, 2013
Room 6496, CUNY GC
Abstract. A “cheap talk” move in a game is a move that does not affect either the subsequent moves available, or the payoffs, for any of the players. The point of such a move can only be to convey information to the other players, but nothing endogenous to the game can determine either what information the player aims to convey, or whether she will be successful in conveying that information. We might add to the game a language that is presumed to be common knowledge among the players, with a semantics that determines the informational content of the cheap talk moves. But since these moves do not affect any payoffs, there is no assurance that the players will tell the truth. My concern in this talk will be with the problem of characterizing the conditions under which a cheap talk message will be credible: the conditions under which players receiving a message will have reason to believe that the sending player is telling the truth. The rough idea is that a message is credible when the payoffs are such that the sending player wants the receiving player to believe the message only if it is true, but there are problems making this idea precise. I will look at some simple and familiar games when they are preceded by a cheap talk move in which a player has the opportunity to signal what moves he intends to make, and at some signaling games that raise problems for the definition of credibility.