Subjective Perspectives and Perceptual Variance

In Ori Beck (ed.), The relational view of perception: new philosophical essays. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 45-82 (2025)
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Abstract

Perception is to its core perspectival: we perceive our surrounding from a location, under specific lighting and acoustic conditions and other such perceptual conditions. Due to the perspectival nature of perception, any case of perception can have both variant and invariant properties. While the variant properties alter with changes in perceptual conditions, the invariant properties remain stable regardless of such changes. What is the nature of these variant and invariant properties? Are they properties in our environment? Are they properties of perceptual consciousness? By explaining the variant and invariant aspect of perceptual consciousness in terms of representations of external, mind-independent properties in our environment, this paper furthers an externalist account of perceptual consciousness. In doing so, it breaks with a long tradition—still alive today—of analyzing perspectival variance purely in terms of mind-dependent appearance properties. Perceptual variance is a key aspect of our subjective perspective and our egocentric point of view. The offered analysis of perspectival variance provides an explanation for how perspectival variance characterizes the subjective perspective of any perceiver—be it a dolphin, snake, or human.

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Susanna Schellenberg
Rutgers - New Brunswick

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