https://philpapers.org 2008-07-01T00:00+00:00 1 daily https://philarchive.org/rec/ALMGHT _Diametros_ 22 (82):53-63. 2025In their recent article in this journal, Giubilini, Gur-Arie, and Jamrozik argue that there is more to expertise than individual healthcare professionals’ knowledge of their fields. To be an expert is to be recognized as a credible authority, they explain, and being a credible authority necessitates trust. Among the core ethical principles they identify for trustworthy experts in medicine and healthcare are honesty, humility, and transparency. Here I aim to affirm these authors’ linkage of expertise and trust by decoupling both from a presumptive norm of transparency. My suggestion is not that medical or healthcare experts should lie or deceive, but that articulating their credible authority in terms of transparency mischaracterizes things. We see this in several ways: through the negative epistemic effects of a general norm of expert transparency, the importance of discretion in healthy trust relations, and the need for relationally responsive interpretation in how medical and health experts communicate with different patients and publics across social-epistemic difference. https://philarchive.org/rec/ABECOB In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewinski (eds.), _Virtues of argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013_. OSSA. 2014For the last decade there has been a growing interest in the interplay between mathematical practice and argumentation. The study of each of these areas promises to shed light on the other, as I and several other authors from a variety of disciplines have argued. I am particularly grateful to Begoña Carrascal for her careful critique of some central assumptions of this programme, as such challenges are vital for its long-term success. In this commentary, I wish to respond to two of her main points in a similar spirit. She writes: “From a review of many of the papers [of the programme]... we can extract two main ideas. First, Johnson’s influential definition placed a burden on many of their authors to justify the claim that mathematical products are argumentative. Second, there is a manifest tension in these works between the examples of mathematical products considered as arguments and the process that leads to them” (Carrascal, 2013, p. 6). I will address each of these ideas in turn.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=ABECOB&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.uwindsor.ca%2Fossaarchive%2FOSSA10%2Fpapersandcommentaries%2F35">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/FANACA-2 _Asian Journal of Philosophy_. forthcomingRecently, Simon Goldstein and Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini have argued that certain existing AI systems are capable of well-being. They consider the three leading approaches to well-being—hedonism, desire satisfactionism, and the objective list approach—and argue that theories of these kinds plausibly imply that some current AI systems are capable of welfare. In this paper, I argue that the leading versions of each of these theories do not imply this. I conclude that we have strong reason to doubt that current AI systems are capable of well-being. https://philarchive.org/rec/STEGOS-2 _The Pluralist_ 20 (1):117-123. 2025In this philosophical response to Terrance MacMullan’s From American Empire to América Cósmica through Philosophy: Prospero’s Reflection (2023), I engage with his ambitious project of inter-American philosophy and critique of U.S. imperialism. I reflect on our shared positionality as white scholars raised in Spanish-speaking regions and analyze his engagement with philosophers like Pedro Albizu Campos and Gloria Anzaldúa. While praising MacMullan's contributions, I draw upon Anzaldúa's "Geographies of Selves" concept to suggest that more "autohistoria" or self-disclosure would enhance the existential depth and philosophical power of his project.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=STEGOS-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fscholarlypublishingcollective.org%2Fpluralist%2Farticle%2F20%2F1%2F117%2F396900%2FGeographies-of-Selves-Haciendo-una-America-Cosmica">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/FERAMO-3 In Christoph Asmuth, Anne Becker & Lea Fink (eds.), _Das Fortleben der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie in der Kritischen Theorie_. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. pp. 17-30. 2025Adorno´s critique of absolute idealism is beset with considerable hermeneutical errors. Adorno does not fail to notice, however, that Hegel addressed many of the open questions of transcendental idealism and tried to solve them. For example, Adorno recognizes that Hegel criticized Kant and Fichte precisely because they both ultimately advocated a formal conception of subjectivity; Hegel unceasingly stressed instead the importance of the intrinsic unity of subject and object. Furthermore, Adorno acknowledges that Hegel rejected the pure identity of the I as the starting point of the system and claimed that the different conceptions of reality developed by the human mind are based on the successive contradictions of the objects with their own concepts – for Adorno this is the reason why Hegel was able to expound his philosophy on the basis of the thoughts of the subject in the Phenomenology of Spirit and from the determinations of the object in the Science of Logic. Adorno explicitly recognizes that the attempt to develop dialectics from both sides, that is, from the subject and the object, was an advance of Hegel over earlier idealists. Adorno, finally, accepts that, although Hegel characterizes subjectivity as absolute, objectivity plays a decisive role in his philosophy. With Hegel, according to Adorno, idealism reaches its maximum strength and its highest elevation. Now, despite recognizing the advantages of Hegel´s approach Adorno nonetheless maintains that absolute idealism ultimately rests on the radicalization of transcendental idealism, as a further expansion of its basic principle. Hegel disagreed with transcendental idealism, but he did not abandon its main project of deriving all determinacy from subjective thought; he therefore did not contest the priority of the subject. Although Adorno recognizes the value of many of the solutions that Hegel offers to solve the theoretical tensions within transcendental idealism, he thinks that those solutions do not actually resolve these tensions – in Adorno´s eyes they simply cannot be solved within the idealistic paradigm. It is not unfair to say that Adorno misunderstands Hegel´s absolute idealism as a heterodox attempt to further develop Fichte´s philosophical program in a divergent way (especially as it is presented in the Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre). Adorno´s supposedly ‘immanent’ critique of absolute idealism is in fact based on a highly controversial interpretation of Hegel´s approach, which is to resolve those problematic claims of Kant´s and Fichte´s variants of idealism that Adorno himself considers untenable. https://philarchive.org/rec/CASTRI-7 _AI and Ethics_. forthcomingThe demands of fair machine learning are often expressed in probabilistic terms. Yet, most of the systems of concern are deterministic in the sense that whether a given subject will receive a given score on the basis of their traits is, for all intents and purposes, either zero or one. What, then, can justify this probabilistic talk? We argue that the statistical reference classes used in fairness measures can be understood as defining the probability that hypothetical persons, who are representative of social roles, will receive certain goods. We call these hypothetical persons “representative individuals.” We claim that what we owe to actual, concrete individuals—whose individual chances of receiving the good in the system might be extreme (i.e., either zero or one)—is that their representative individual has an appropriate probability of receiving the good in question. While less immediately intuitive than other approaches, we argue that the representative individual approach has important advantages over other ways of making sense of this probabilistic talk in the context of fair machine learning https://philarchive.org/rec/BROWAW-10 _Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences_. forthcomingMotivational trade-off behaviours, where an organism behaves as if flexibly weighing up an opportunity for reward against a risk of injury, are often regarded as evidence that the organism has valenced experiences like pain. This type of evidence has been influential in shifting opinion regarding crabs and insects. Critics note that (i) the precise links between trade-offs and consciousness are not fully known; (ii) simple trade-offs are evinced by the nematode worm Caenorhabditis elegans, mediated by a mechanism plausibly too simple to support conscious experience; (iii) pain can sometimes interfere with rather than support making trade-offs rationally. However, rather than undermining trade-off evidence in general, such cases show that the nature of the trade-off, and its underlying neural substrate, matter. We investigate precisely how. https://philarchive.org/rec/LUAACR _Critical Philosophy of Race_. forthcomingIn this critical response, I clarify my critique of the commonly held assumption that racism contradicts Kant’s pure moral philosophy. I explain why Kant’s belated criticisms of some practices of slavery should not be interpreted as a rejection of colonial slavery as an institution. I end with a reflection on the relation between Kant’s philosophy and anti-racism. https://philarchive.org/rec/PALTNO-11 _Synthese_. forthcomingRecent works in epistemology have defended the existence of acquaintance knowledge—a non-propositional form of knowledge constituted by the subject's acquaintance with particulars. A significant obstacle to the epistemic legitimacy of acquaintance knowledge lies in the fact that acquaintance is a descriptive psychological phenomenon, whereas knowledge is a normative one. In this paper, I aim to address this challenge by arguing that introspective acquaintance knowledge—the subject's knowledge of their own experiences constituted by acquaintance with them—exhibits a normative dimension. My argument critically hinges on the role of conscious introspective attention. Based on the idea that a distinctive manifestation of the presence of epistemic normativity has to do (at least) with the possibility for a piece of knowledge to be epistemically better or worse, I will argue that we can have epistemically better or worse introspective acquaintance knowledge and that this depends on the degree of attention that is involved in it. By assuming that possibly being epistemically better or worse implies that a piece of knowledge possibly instantiates different degrees of epistemic goodness, and that conscious introspective attention comes in degrees, I will argue that conscious attention plays a gradual epistemic role in acquaintance knowledge. The paper aims to strengthen the case for introspective acquaintance knowledge as a genuine form of epistemic achievement, governed by attention-based normative standards. https://philarchive.org/rec/TARPNA _Studia Semiotyczne_ 36 (1):63-83. 2022In this article, I argue for two theses. The first is that, among different existing accounts of proper name semantics, indexicalism—a stance that treats proper names as indexical expressions—is best suited to explaining various phenomena exhibited by the use of proper names in fictional discourse. I will discuss these phenomena and compare the solutions offered by traditional descriptivist and causal-historical theories of proper name reference with those proposed by indexicalists. Subsequently, I will offer a novel account of indexicalism about proper names, which uses the apparatus of so-called hybrid expressions (Ciecierski, 2020; Künne, 1992; Predelli, 2006) as an alternative to traditional Kaplanian semantics for demonstratives. I offer an argument explaining why, among the variety of indexical views, one should favour such a hybrid theory over other available ones (e.g., Pelczar, Rainsbury, 1998; Rami, 2014) based on the analysis of “distributed utterances” (McCullagh, 2020) and statements that employ more than one fictional context. https://philarchive.org/rec/DIATMO-3 What is the metaphysics of gender about? Metaphysics is the study of what there is and what it is like. On this conception, questions in the metaphysics of gender would be about the existence and nature of gender. That is, the metaphysics of gender would be about whether alleged gender categories such as being a man, a woman or an agender person are real features or kinds, and if so, what their nature is. In recent years, the metaphysics of gender has received a lot of attention and has shifted from being a rather marginal part of metaphysics to being a growing area of interest. Moreover, growing attention to the metaphysics of gender and the social domain have given rise to fruitful methodological questions about what metaphysics is about and what are the best methods to pursue metaphysical inquiries. This Element offers a survey of recent discussions of these questions.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=DIATMO-3&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1017%2F9781009264167">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/BENTCS-8 _Review of Social Economy_ 82 (1):147-175. 2024Corporations can be powerful engines of economic prosperity, but also for the public good more broadly conceived. But they need to be properly incentivized to fulfil these missions. We propose an innovative plan called the Corporate Social Assessment (CSA). Every four years, a randomly selected Citizens’ Assembly will meet to decide a grading scheme for assessing companies’ conduct. At the end of the cycle, a professional assessment body will grade the companies and rank them. The ranking will be the basis for subsidies to higher-tier companies, to be paid out of a fund to which all companies will contribute, to create a race to the top which financially rewards corporations taking public concerns seriously. The CSA radicalizes the corporate license to operate. To retain legitimacy in the eyes of wider segments of society, the proposal aims to democratize the way we hold corporations accountable for the power they wield. https://philarchive.org/rec/CLAPAP-17 _Journal of Social Philosophy_. forthcoming<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=CLAPAP-17&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fonlinelibrary.wiley.com%2Fdoi%2F10.1111%2Fjosp.12587">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/KARFHY _Literature & Aesthetics_ 8 (34):6. 2025Friedrich Hölderlin, a German Romantic poet and philosopher, is renowned for his profound and enigmatic poetry, which has significantly influenced modern philosophical thought. His work is characterized by a unique blend of poetic expression and philosophical inquiry, often referred to as "poetosophy". By bridging the gap between poetry and philosophy, Hölderlin’s work invites us to reconsider the ways in which we understand and experience the world. Hölderlin’s poetry frequently explores the relationship between nature and the divine, portraying nature as a manifestation of the divine presence. His poems often depict nature as a source of spiritual revelation and a means to connect with the transcendent. Hölderlin’s poetry often portrays nature as a sacred realm where the divine presence is immanent. He believed that the beauty and grandeur of the natural world are reflections of the divine essence, providing a means for humans to connect with the transcendental. In his poems, nature is not merely a backdrop for human activities but a living, breathing entity that reveals the sacred. For example, in his poem "The Archipelago," Hölderlin describes the sea as a vast, infinite expanse that mirrors the boundless nature of the divine. This imagery evokes a sense of awe and reverence, inviting readers to perceive the divine presence in the natural world. Hölderlin’s use of symbolic and evocative language helps to convey the spiritual dimension of nature, making it a central theme in his work. Hölderlin’s exploration of nature and the divine is characterized by a sense of unity and interconnectedness. He saw the natural world as a manifestation of the divine spirit, where every element is imbued with a sacred presence. This perspective is evident in his hymn-like poems, where he merges the natural and the spiritual to create a sense of wholeness and harmony. In his poem "Patmos," Hölderlin writes about the presence of the divine in nature, suggesting that the sacred can be found in the beauty and mystery of the natural world. This idea of unity between nature and spirit is central to his poetic vision, emphasizing the interconnectedness of all things and the potential for spiritual revelation through nature. Hölderlin believed that language has the power to reveal the essence of being. He saw poetry as a means to transcend ordinary language and express the ineffable and the divine. This idea resonates with Martin Heidegger’s later assertion that "language is the house of being." For Hölderlin, poetic language is not just a tool for communication but a medium through which the deepest truths about existence can be unveiled.Hölderlin saw language as more than just a tool for communication; he believed it to be a medium through which the essence of being is revealed. For Hölderlin, poetic language has the unique ability to express the ineffable and to capture the profound mysteries of existence. He believed that through poetry, one could access a deeper understanding of reality and the divine. Hölderlin’s poetry is characterized by its rich and evocative use of language. He often employs metaphor, imagery, and symbolism to convey complex philosophical ideas. By transcending the limitations of ordinary language, his poetry seeks to reveal the hidden connections between different aspects of existence. In this way, Hölderlin’s work embodies the idea that language is a means of revelation, a way to uncover the deeper truths that lie beneath the surface of everyday experience. In Hölderlin’s view, the poet plays a crucial role in mediating the relationship between language and being. The poet’s task is to bring forth the sacred and the divine through the power of poetic language. Hölderlin believed that the poet has the ability to transform reality, to make visible the invisible, and to reveal the profound truths that underlie ordinary experience. The poet becomes a bridge between the human and the divine, the finite and the infinite. Hölderlin’s poetry often explores the idea of the unity of language and being. He believed that poetic language has the power to reveal the inherent interconnectedness of all things. Through his poetry, Hölderlin sought to express a sense of wholeness and harmony that transcends the fragmented reality of everyday life. His work invites readers to engage with the world in a deeply spiritual and contemplative manner, recognizing the divine presence in the beauty and mystery of nature.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=KARFHY&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.researchgate.net%2Fprofile%2FAlexis-Karpouzos">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/NGUTUB As gatekeepers, editors and reviewers play a central role in identifying reliable and valuable scientific works for preservation and dissemination, contributing to subsequent knowledge production and public use. Despite its benefits, the rejection mechanism often carries significant emotional and career consequences for researchers. The analysis of 304 rejection letters since 2022 indicates that over 97% of rejections were attributed solely to authors’ shortcomings or the journal’s rigorous evaluation standards, while less than 3% cited journal-side limitations. This pattern suggests a prevailing tendency where journals position themselves as the standard of quality, implicitly framing rejected research as inherently unqualified and placing an undue burden on authors—the primary producers of knowledge. Given the fallibility of journals, we propose a shift from viewing them as gatekeepers to recognizing them as facilitators of knowledge production. This transition would require embracing intellectual humility, thereby alleviating the rejection-induced burdens on researchers and fostering a more constructive scholarly environment. https://philarchive.org/rec/WEBTMO-5 _Synthese_. forthcomingCould we transfer you from your biological substrate to an electronic hardware by simulating your brain on a computer? The answer to this question divides optimists and pessimists about mind uploading. Optimists believe that you can genuinely survive the transition; pessimists think that surviving mind uploading is impossible. An influential argument against uploading optimism is the multiplicity objection. In a nutshell, the objection is as follows: If uploading optimism were true, it should be possible to create not only one, but multiple digital versions of you. However, you cannot literally become many. Hence, you cannot survive even a single instance of uploading, and optimism about uploading is misguided. In this paper, I will first spell out the multiplicity objection in detail and then provide a two-pronged defence against the objection. First, uploading pessimists cannot establish that uploading optimism has the contentious implication. Second, it is in fact plausible to think that we could become multiple distinct persons. Optimists’ hope for a digital afterlife is therefore not thwarted by the prospect of multiplicity. https://philarchive.org/rec/ZAPUNA _Sophia_ 63 (3):553-569. 2024The notion of maximal greatness is arguably part of the very concept of God: something greater than God is not even possible. But how should we understand this notion? The aim of this paper is to provide a Śaivist answer to this question by analyzing the form of theism advocated in the Pratyabhijñā tradition. First, I extract a model of divine greatness, the Hierarchical Model, from Nagasawa’s work "Maximal God". According to the Hierarchical Model, God is that than which nothing could be greater by virtue of being better suited than all other beings in relation to certain great-making properties (§1). I then offer an analysis of the form of theism advocated in the Pratyabhijñā tradition by discussing passages from the works of Somānanda, the founder of the Pratyabhijñā school, and of Utpaladeva, the most prominent of Somānanda’s disciples. I argue that the Pratyabhijñā theist cannot account for divine greatness in terms of the Hierarchical Model. My argument is that the Hierarchical Model requires a comparison between God and other beings that cannot be made with the Pratyabhijñā God (§2). Finally, I develop an original alternative model, the Unlimited Nature Model, that accounts for God’s maximal greatness in a way that suits Pratyabhijñā’s theism. According to the Unlimited Nature Model, the nature of all ordinary beings is metaphysically limited as a result of realizing only a small portion of the potential of what could be, and God is maximally great because only he has a completely unlimited nature (§3).<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=ZAPUNA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2F10.1007%2Fs11841-024-01005-1">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/KREPLA _Ucla Journal of Islamic and Near East Law_. forthcomingCampaigns highlighting the alleged incompatibility of the Islamic polity with principles of democratic self-governance are longstanding. The basic assumption of the incompatibalist proposition runs as follows: Political legitimacy in Muslim polities can be reduced to a principle of conformity with a set of divinely given rules and norms, the Sharīʿa, occasionally supplemented, and interpreted, by Islamic legal scholars and practitioners. In short, political Islam recognizes the Sharīʿa and Usūl al-fiqh (or, for the purposes of this essay, fiqh, for short) as the Islamic polity’s foundations––those are deemed incompatible with democratic participation. In response, Mohammad Fadel (2018) has argued that the legal instrument of maṣlaḥa, which Fadel summarizes as considerations of the “public good” or “general interest,” can establish the democratic accountability mechanism that critics see missing in political authorities of Sharīʿa–grounded polities. Fadel supports this normative view with reference to some select classical Sunni jurisprudence, particularly the Usūl al-fiqh. I contest this view in two ways: Firstly, on a conceptual level, most thorough analyses of democracy acknowledge responsiveness and active involvement as fundamental components of democratic self-rule. Fadel’s idea of maṣlaḥa does not entirely align with this notion. Secondly, from a doctrinal standpoint, Fadel’s argument is confined solely within the classical Sunni context. That means, Fadel’s argument is contingent upon a significant departure from numerous (potentially the majority) sources within a comprehensive lineage of maṣlaḥa. https://philarchive.org/rec/TANTPN _Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy_. forthcomingThe article challenges the notion that political realism necessarily requires a distinctively political normativity. Drawing on the works of Weber and Nietzsche, it offers an alternative reading of political realism. The article uncovers in Williams’ scholarship a dual-layered legitimacy framework, displaying three inherent demands (namely, discursive, intelligibility, and reflective vindication demand) in his idea of legitimacy. In so doing, the article demonstrates how political realism employs its own prescriptive resources to critically scrutinize politics, while highlighting the crucial distinction between political realism and applied ethics. The article finally contends that political realism can, through immanent critique, maintain its evaluative standards and critical potency without necessarily engaging with political normativity.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=TANTPN&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.tandfonline.com%2Fdoi%2Ffull%2F10.1080%2F0020174X.2025.2470876">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/FRATSF-8 _Metaphysica_. forthcomingHere I present an analysis of what it is for an x and a y to be the same F. Unlike the Fregean Analysis (FRE), according to which ‘x is the same F as y’ is equivalent to ‘x is an F, y is an F, and x = y’, the analysis presented and defended here allows that there are possible cases in which x and y are the same F1 but not the same F2 even though x is an F2 and y is an F2. The analysis offered here, FRE+, retains the conditions that FRE deems are necessary for being the same F while adding a further condition to allow that the same F1 can be a different F2. Although FRE+ is compatible with there being such cases, FRE+ shares with FRE that the identity mentioned in the analysis is nothing other than absolute identity. Thus, FRE+ offers a way to allow that the same F1 can be a different F2 while avoiding conflict with the traditionally accepted logic of identity, and I argue without conflict with the Indiscernibility of Identicals in particular. https://philarchive.org/rec/EGACOF _Mind and Language_. 2025Favela and Machery conclude from their studies that neuroscientists' and psychologists' concept of representation is both unclear and confused. Rather than advocating reform or elimination of the concept, they suggest that it can serve various theoretical purposes precisely because it is unclear and confused. I challenge their claim that the concept of representation, as used by neuroscientists and psychologists, is unclear and confused, and I propose an alternative explanation of why it might appear to be so. https://philarchive.org/rec/IMPEVM _Journal of Philosophy_. forthcomingSometimes, a metaphysical theory has revisionary ethical consequences: for example, some have thought that modal realism entails that there are no moral obligations. In these cases, one may be tempted to reject the metaphysical theory on the grounds that it conflicts with commonsensical ethics. This is an ethics-to-metaphysics inference. My claim is that this inference is in general irrational, and that the fact that a metaphysical theory has highly revisionary ethical consequences is no reason at all to reject the theory. I argue for this claim on the basis of general epistemic principles about the transmission of justification, and what makes for a good argument. Furthermore, I argue that my account can explain why a certain narrow class of ethics-to-metaphysics inferences are rational. https://philarchive.org/rec/BANTPO-32 The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The philosophy of superdeterminism dismantles the main philosophical teachings of Friedrich Nietzsche, who professed self-construction of meaning in life through one’s own will to power. However, it is impossible to self-construct meaning in life in the absence of cause and effect in physics. Moreover, superdeterminism strongly suggests the existence of a supremely intelligent God, who predetermined everything that happens in the universe, including the lives and thoughts of all human beings. Meaning in life is God given under the philosophy of superdeterminism. God is anything but dead. https://philarchive.org/rec/HARBTW-2 _Brill_. forthcomingAbstract: I argue that Orientalism continues to construct Arabs as subjects that cannot suffer violence, particularly the violence of torture. Beginning with Edward Said’s observation that Orientalists constructed ‘Arabs’ in the nineteenth -century as inorganic, metallic, and mineralized beings, I trace these themes through various sites in and around Guantanamo Bay. One finds the tropes of Orientalism in the Bybee memo as well as in the diary of Mohamedou Ould Slahi. Through these three distinct but related moments, one finds that Orientalism continues to produce Arabs as inorganic entities beyond death and thereby immune to violence and specifically the violence of torture. Insofar as imperialism has co-opted the language of non-violence by constructing its enemies as inviolable, one must recognize the Orientalized Arab as a receptor of limitless ‘non - violent’ hostilities.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=HARBTW-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fbrill.com%2Fview%2Fjournals%2Fsoi%2Fsoi-overview.xml">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/ACAWDM _Journal of Military, Veteran and Family Health_. forthcomingThe predominant account of the etiology of moral injuries among Veterans and military personnel in the clinical psychological and psychiatric literature construes morality as inherent in belief structures. This supports the conceptualization of moral injuries as intrapsychic phenomena resulting from exposure to high-stakes events in which fixed beliefs are contravened in ways that result in psychological harms, including maladaptive beliefs and distress. We identify several problems with this formulation and offer suggestions for modification, including greater focus on: 1) experiences rather than events in identifying circumstances in which moral injuries occur, and 2) degradation of relevant relationships rather than conflicts with and among moral contents. These shifts in framing could have epidemiological salience, facilitating more robust case characterization and enabling a variety of approaches to reestablishing the moral conditions that support life affirmation. https://philarchive.org/rec/FLOCAL-2 _Metaphysica_ 26 (1). 2025In this paper, I shall discuss the question whether a concrete object can be multi-located while it is moving or not. I shall say nothing on the vexed issue of multi-location in and for itself. Instead, my discussion will support a ‘might’-conditional claim: ‘if multi-location were possible, then change might imply multi-location’. To do this, after a very short clarification of the various meanings of ‘to be located’, I will first present and discuss Diodorus’ arguments against the reality of motion, since they focus on the question of what the location of the moving item is, and then scrutinize Hegel’s reply to Diodorus Cronus’ reasonings, insofar as his answer consists in claiming that an object in motion is in many locations at once. Although many philosophers of the past are referred to, this paper does not aim to be a piece of scholarship, but to explore the various metaphysical possibilities con-cerning the logic of location underlying change.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=FLOCAL-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.degruyter.com%2Fdocument%2Fdoi%2F10.1515%2Fmp-2024-0011%2Fhtml">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/MILWWY In Ali Hossein Khani & Gary Kemp (eds.), _ Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers: His Influence on Historical and Contemporary Analytic Philosophers (Volume II)_. Routledge. forthcomingIn 1921, John Wisdom (1904–1993) became a member of Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge, where he read philosophy and attended lectures by G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad, and J. E. McTaggart. He received his BA in 1924, after which he worked for five years at the National Institute of Industrial Psychology. From 1929 to 1934, Wisdom was a Lecturer in the department of logic and metaphysics at the University of St Andrews and a colleague of G. F. Stout. After the publication of his book Interpretation and Analysis (1931) and five articles on “Logical Constructions” in Mind (1931–3), Wisdom became a Lecturer in Moral Sciences in Cambridge and a Fellow of Trinity College. This gave him the opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Since nothing by Wittgenstein but Tractatus appeared in print for decades, Wisdom’s publications of these years were—mistakenly—read as portents of the new ideas of Wittgenstein himself. The publication of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in 1953 brought with it, among other things, the fall of Wisdom’s popularity. https://philarchive.org/rec/PUZTFO _Zeitschrift Für Semiotik_ 45 (3-4):29-47. 2023In times of rapid technological progress, transhumanism, which strives for radical technological transformations of the human being, spreads its ideas with great publicity and media impact. Although these ideas are directed towards the future, they influence how we understand humans, bodies, and technology today. T his article exam­ ines the anthropology of transhumanism and investigates the extent to which it offers approaches for the contemporary anthropology of body optimisation. T he article comes to the conclusion that the understanding of the human being in transhumanism is prob­ lematic in many respects and therefore not suitable for the further development of a contemporary philosophical anthropology. Nevertheless, corrective perspectives for an anthropology of contemporary body optimisation can be derived from these problems. https://philarchive.org/rec/RSNMRA _Bioethics_. forthcoming https://philarchive.org/rec/CRENOC In this paper, I argue that Nietzsche thinks emotional experience is constructed. To say that my experience of a particular emotion—for example, compassion—is constructed is to say that any instance of compassion I experience is something of my own making. Specifically, it is a feeling-state fabricated by my mind as it (automatically and unwittingly) interprets the phenomenally experienced bodily feelings to which I find myself subject in a particular circumstance. In other words, any compassion I experience is the result of my mind having constructed such a feeling. What’s more, since Nietzsche thinks the process by which my mind interprets these bodily feelings will always involve the deployment of socially available emotion concepts and emotion narratives, he will think not only that emotions are constructed, but that they are constructed via social artifacts. Recognizing that our emotional lives are shaped by the emotion concepts and narratives we utilize to make sense of them suggests that enlarging our emotional vocabulary and familiarizing ourselves with new emotional narratives can be profoundly transformative. It also highlights the possibility of reflective intervention into our emotional and perceptual lives, potentially opening up new ways of feeling and seeing.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=CRENOC&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fstatic1.squarespace.com%2Fstatic%2F66e483f391d7340c3200b97f%2Ft%2F67aa214d78ffae38e36a4a6e%2F1739202894128%2FKaitlyn%2BCreasy%2BCV%2B2-2025.pdf">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/CHAKYA The agentic web refers to a vision of the internet where AI agents play a central role in facilitating interactions, automating tasks, and enhancing user experiences. Realizing this vision requires us to rethink how we govern the internet. Within the agentic web, the promise of AI systems becoming more decentralized and autonomous represents unique challenges and opportunities for governance, necessitating innovative approaches to ensure responsible integration into society. Toward this end, we propose the Know Your Agent framework, designed to manage Decentralized AI agents through identity verification, behavioral monitoring, and accountability mechanisms. Our approach integrates protocol science and legal engineering, utilizing blockchain technology to support these efforts. https://philarchive.org/rec/BARTGB _Herança – History, Heritage and Culture Journal_ 7 (Special):12–30. 2024The advent of AI calls for an existential self-redefinition of humanity. It necessitates the establishment of a pluralistic global humanist culture that enables us to coexist in the new world of active media and autopoietic technology. In this paper, related philosophical questions give rise to the proposal of a novel metaculture that elevates human heritages and cultural memories to the plane of a digital AI- based infrastructure. I argue for a balanced and holistic approach to human-to-human and human–AI interactions and metaculture that can be developed in the form of combinatorial “metagames” that reflect the potential of human consciousness, transcend the boundaries between technology, human embodiment and biology, the arts, sciences and humanities, and philosophy, and, finally, include the element of meaningful coincidence and spontaneity “in the second potency.” Hermann Hesse’s final novel, The Glass Bead Game, offers a key to understanding this basic idea. His vision is extremely relevant today. Based on this, the concept of cultivating global cultural memories through innovative aesthetic-epistemic “Glass Bead Games 2.0” is discussed further from a systematic angle. To complement this, reference is also made to Hesse’s own source of inspiration: Novalis’s “encyclopedist” approach interlinks aesthetic and epistemic productivity in a way that could become a major starting point to create a new holistic metaculture in the Age of AI.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=BARTGB&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Frevistaheranca.com%2Findex.php%2Fheranca%2Farticle%2Fview%2F1120%2F837">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/WODMAM _Northwestern University Law Review_. forthcomingMalapportionment—electoral districts with divergent ratios of people to representation—was ruled to be unconstitutional in a widely venerated series of cases before the Warren Court. Those cases held that a principle of political equality, ‘one person, one vote’, is required by the Constitution. But what is the content of that principle? Many Justices and commentators declare that it is vague, empty, circular, or meaningless. This creates a murder mystery. Malapportionment was killed; but by what, exactly? This Article seeks an answer by focusing on the Court’s commitments about the scope and strictness of one person, one vote: it is a broad (rather than narrow) principle of rough (rather than exact) equality. As such, one person, one vote requires an equal number of people per district and an equal number of votes per voter; and it requires a roughly equal number of people per district. These commitments are attractive in isolation. But, this Article shows, they are objectionable in conjunction: they entail that one person, one vote is too permissive, as it only requires a roughly equal number of votes per voter. If your vote is roughly equal to mine when your district is fractionally more populous than mine, your vote is also roughly equal to mine when I can cast fractionally more votes than you. Since this problem follows inexorably from the Court’s commitments about the scope and strictness of one person, one vote, there are two possible solutions. First, one person, one vote could be broad a principle of exact equality; administrability may then justify underenforcing the principle in distributing voters to districts, but not in distributing votes to voters. Second, one person, one vote could include a narrow principle requiring rough equality in apportionment, as well as a distinct principle requiring exactly equal votes per voter. These solutions have important constitutional implications—including for resolving the population baseline at issue in malapportionment, which remains uncertain after Evenwel v. Abbott. But neither provides an easy way out. Each makes one person, one vote either too restrictive or too permissive. This puzzle brings to light why the operative principle in a venerated series of cases is deeply unclear and unsettled. But it has a special significance beyond that. One person, one vote lies at the heart of America’s constitutional democracy, which is already under considerable threat. On the one hand, if the content of the principle is too restrictive (or too uncertain), then objections to its constitutionality are considerably strengthened. On the other hand, if it is too permissive, then one person, one vote provides little constraint on Vice-President J.D. Vance’s recent proposal to give extra votes to parents, as well as myriad similar policies and procedures that would erode voters’ equality at the ballot box. https://philarchive.org/rec/MILSWH-2 In Ali Hossein Khani & Gary Kemp (eds.), _ Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers: His Influence on Historical and Contemporary Analytic Philosophers (Volume II)_. Routledge. forthcomingSusan Stebbing wrote only once on Wittgenstein, in her paper ‘Logical Positivism and Analysis’ (1933). The paper was unusually critical of Wittgenstein. It put the Cambridge analytic philosophy of Moore and Russell in a sharp opposition to the positivist philosophy of the Vienna Circle, in which Stebbing included Wittgenstein. Whereas the positivists were interested in analysing language, the Cambridge realists were analysing facts. To be more explicit, the analytic philosophers were engaged in directional analysis, which seeks to illuminate (to elucidate) the multiplicity of the analysed facts. In contrast, positivists aimed at a final analysis that proves that there are simples. Stebbing’s sympathies were clearly on the side of the Cambridge realists. The important implication of Stebbing’s paper was that it urged Wittgenstein to change the style of his philosophy, abandoning those points which allegedly connected him with the Vienna Circle. https://philarchive.org/rec/HARRRB-6 _Synthese_ 205 (3):1-18. 2025I begin with a gap in the literature on conversational relevance, wherein utterances that shift probability distributions included in the common ground do not count as relevant if they do not rule out one or more answers to the question under discussion. In order to provide a satisfying account of probabilistic conversational relevance, I introduce a relevance measure, \(R(\cdot )\). I motivate six axioms for such a function, and show that they uniquely characterize the symmetrized Kullback–Leibler divergence. I then show how we can incorporate this result into an expanded definition of conversational relevance.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=HARRRB-6&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2F10.1007%2Fs11229-025-04943-6">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/WORAOA-3 _Philosophical Psychology_. forthcomingSeveral decades of work in both philosophy and psychology acutely highlights our limitations as individual inquirers. One way to recognize these limitations is to defer to experts: roughly, to form one’s beliefs on the basis of expert testimony. Yet, as has become salient in the age of Brexit, Trumpist politics, and climate change denial, people are often mistrustful of experts, and unwilling to defer to them. It’s a trope of highbrow public discourse that this unwillingness is a serious pathology. But to what extent is this trope accurate? Answering this requires us to settle both a normative question—under exactly what conditions ought we to defer to experts?—and an empirical question—under what conditions are people willing to defer to experts? The first question has been investigated primarily by philosophers; the second, primarily by psychologists. Yet there is little work integrating these literatures and putting together their results. The aim of this review article is to begin this task, enabling us to begin reaching conclusions about how much real practices of deference diverge from the ideal. We present an opinionated guide to relevant work from both philosophy and psychology, and note places where the literature has important gaps. https://philarchive.org/rec/CAPPFD-2 https://philarchive.org/rec/NAVAAI _Mind_. forthcomingThis paper argues that inference rule adoption is a diachronic process during which agents are inferentially guided by a statement of the rule they are adopting, but during which they do not use that rule. Rather, the ability to use the rule is the outcome at the end of the process. This account avoids a regress objection to inferentially guided adoption recently posed by Boghossian and Wright. Adoption, on this model, involves the use of six privileged inference rules, including universal instantiation, modus ponens, and the naive truth rules. However, though these rules play a special role in adoption, they are not indispensable to the process in their full generality: so long as one has reasonably robust restrictions of them, the adoption process is unimpeded. Furthermore, there are no general forms that constitute the minimal restrictions of these rules required for adoption. It follows that these rules, in their fully generality, are themselves adoptable, so long as one begins with reasonable restrictions of them. It is argued that this is enough to overcome the ‘adoption problem’ as a challenge to anti-exceptionalism about logic and to the normative significance of proposals for alternative logics. https://philarchive.org/rec/HAGGDA _Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective_ 14 (2):35-45. 2025<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=HAGGDA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fsocial-epistemology.com%2F2025%2F02%2F18%2Fgeneralist-denialism-and-the-particularist-critique-kurtis-hagen%2F">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/ALIEMM While the present information ecosystem is still undergoing a tsunami of repeated algorithmic superintelligence (ASI) achievement claims linked to the motif of the epistemic perpetuum mobile (EPM), will the laterally emerging and slowly propagating quantum ASI hype finally lead to a multiversal fear of missing out? Instead of adding novel entries to the already large enough and growing set of prophecies about the future promulgated in the deepfake era, this paper written for purposes of self-education utilizes a recent epistemic complexity theory to answer the following natural scientific question: could the impossibility to build a multiversal ASI be amenable to experimental problematization? https://philarchive.org/rec/GREAOM-3 _Australasian Journal of Philosophy_ 101 (2):455-469. 2023This paper claims that the argument that Aristotle seems to ascribe to Melissus in Physics III.6 about infinity is different from Melissus’ original argument. On scrutiny, it turns out that the Aristotelian version of the argument takes Melissus to suppose that being is unlimited because it is not in contact with anything else. I claim that this is not Melissus’ notion of unlimitedness for being, and that the Aristotelian version hinges on a reversal of Melissus’ own reasoning.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=GREAOM-3&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.tandfonline.com%2Fdoi%2Ffull%2F10.1080%2F00048402.2021.1993450">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/STAMOM-2 In Branden Fitelson (ed.), _Festschrift for Alan Hájek's 60th birthday_. Springer. forthcomingWriting philosophy well is an essential skill in our discipline. Philosophical writing must aim for clarity, precision, and rigor, but in doing so, it can often wind up dry, long-winded and boring. It can take many drafts to produce a paper that is suitable for publication in a journal, and many aspiring (and accomplished!) academic philosophers find the process of writing arduous and frustrating. Still, some people make it look easy – if you’ve read anything by Alan Hájek, you’ve probably noticed his breezy style that effortlessly communicates complex ideas in simple terms. His concise and witty prose makes even formal epistemology, a notoriously complicated, math-heavy subject, accessible and engaging to readers. However, while it might look effortless, Hájek’s spirited style is in fact born out of deep and thoughtful engagement with the craft of writing. His motto is: “Work hard for your readers, so that they don’t have to.” Hájek’s approach is decidedly anti-genius: he believes that having good ideas and communicating them well can be taught, and he has devoted considerable energy to helping his graduate students improve their writing. He has written multiple articles about philosophical creativity, as well as an unpublished lengthy manuscript on the mechanics of writing. I have benefited myself from his advice – at least I believe I have, readers may judge for themselves. My aim in this article is to share a few of his insights that I have found most helpful for myself and for my students. I won’t try to summarize all of Hájek’s advice, and I also don’t claim that all of this is totally new. Rather, I will offer a small collection of greatest hits. I will cover eight aspects of philosophical writing, and for each one, I will explain the basic idea, and then discuss some ways of implementing it for oneself and one’s students. https://philarchive.org/rec/ARVWAA _Journal of Moral Philosophy_ 20 (1-2):47-78. 2023To what extent are authors morally culpable for harms caused by their published work? Can authors be culpable even if their ideas are misused, perhaps because they failed to take precautions to prevent harmful misinterpretations? Might authors be culpable even if they do take precautions—if, for example, they publish ideas that others can be reasonably expected to put to harmful uses, precautions notwithstanding? Although complete answers to these questions depend upon controversial views about the right to free speech, this paper argues that five notions from philosophy of law and legal practice—liability, burden of proof, legal causation, mens rea, and reasoning by precedent—can be adapted to provide an attractive moral framework for determining whether an author’s work causes harm, whether and how culpable the author is for causing such harm, steps authors may take to immunize themselves from culpability, and how to responsibly develop new rules for publishing ethics.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=ARVWAA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fbrill.com%2Fview%2Fjournals%2Fjmp%2Faop%2Farticle-10.1163-17455243-20223768%2Farticle-10.1163-17455243-20223768.xml">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/SOLDOG _Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy_ 32 (2):91-130. 2024This article aims to establish that Descartes accepted the scholastic view that God’s duration in itself (“eternity”) is not successive but “all at once,” as opposed to temporal things’ durations. Though most scholars have assumed this to be Descartes’ view, Geoffrey Gorham recently called it into question with a number of strong arguments. We contest his interpretation on multiple grounds. First, we show that when Descartes asserts that a duration which is “all at once” is “inconceivable,” he is not making a metaphysical claim but, rather, is making an epistemological one, based on the limitations of the human intellect in understanding the attributes of God. Second, we object to a number of Gorham’s systematic reconstructions of Descartes’ views. He argues among other things that divine simplicity is consistent with temporal parts and that the laws of Cartesian physics require God to have temporal parts. We refute these claims based on Descartes’ fundamental metaphysical commitments. We thus conclude that Descartes does not think that, per se, God’s existence unfolds successively, moment after moment.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=SOLDOG&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pdcnet.org%2Fphilosophica%2Fcontent%2Fphilosophica_2025_0999_2_4_23">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/ABAFBT This thesis uses a biosocial anthropological approach to explore the wide variety of human-environmental interactions exhibited by the Shuar of the Ecuadorian Amazon. Based on 10 months of ethnographic inquiry and deploying a comparative and evolutionary perspective, this thesis focuses primarily on the holistic nature of ancient subsistence patterns. I delve into the adaptive strategies exhibited by the contemporary Shuar and attempt to delineate the socio-ecological, ritual and cosmological significance of these patterns of behaviour. I suggest how subsistence adaptations, like hunting, which have been greatly diminished in the Shuar communities, nevertheless reveal particular forms of cross-species interactions likely deeply rooted in coevolutionary processes. As clearly indicated by informants' oral histories, hunting patterns and meat-eating behaviour show complex trophic, socio-structural and ritual associations between humans and animal taxa. I then hypothesise that food taboos against eating particular animals (mostly large mammals) may have functioned as mechanisms for the preservation of prey and likely arose from ancient relationships with extinct megafauna. Further, concerning horticulture, a subsistence strategy still practised by the Shuar, I reveal how specific forms of human-plant interactions, such as those with Manihot esculenta Crantz and Guadua spp., inform patterns of patterns of growth, fertility and reproduction. This Amazonian form of human-plant coevolution exhibited by traditional horticulture underscores, in principle, basic and higher-order relational processes exemplified by the biosocial, ritual, ontological, and myth-cosmological associations between organismic kingdoms. Concerning the use of medicinal and psychoactive plants, I show how these kinds of botanical knowledge frequently intersect, thus representing adaptive behaviours highly dependent on embodied and cognitive engagements with plant materials. Both conceived as elementary forms of cure and primary triggers of metaphysical formulations, relationships with these elements of the plant kingdom are likely to be well-embedded in our evolutionary history. Lastly, the thesis' attempt at cross-species comparisons linked to different evolutionary periods (i.e., archaic hominins, extant forager-horticulturalists and non-human primates) may shed new light on the nature of complex adaptive patterns exhibited by Indigenous peoples in general and the Shuar in particular. https://philarchive.org/rec/MILOAA-4 _Apa Studies in Native American and Indigenous Philosophy_ 24 (1):13-19. 2024 https://philarchive.org/rec/MCCPOS-4 _Philosophy of Science_. forthcomingThere is an "under-representation problem” in philosophy departments and journals. Empirical data suggest that while we have seen some improvements since the 1990s, the rate of change has slowed down. Some posit that philosophy has disciplinary norms making it uniquely resistant to change (Antony and Cudd 2012; Dotson 2012; Hassoun et al. 2022). In this paper, we present results from an empirical case study of a philosophy department that achieved and maintained male-female gender parity among its faculty as early as 2014. Our analysis extends beyond matters of gender parity because that is only one, albeit important, dimension of inclusion. We build from the case study to reflect on strategies that may catalyze change. https://philarchive.org/rec/DOLHDP _Genetics in Medicine_. forthcomingPurpose This systematic review aims to identify factors that influence parents’ decisions regarding pediatric diagnostic and predictive genetic testing (DT/PT). Factors are integrated into a conceptual model of decision-making. Implications for genetic counseling, research, and ethics are derived. Methods PubMed, PsychInfo, WebofScience and references of related reviews were searched for original publications between 2000 and 2023. Extracted factors were categorized into an existing model. Results Of 5843 publications, 56 met inclusion criteria. The included studies differentiate between DT, traditional, and expanded PT and describe factors impacting parental decisions on both to have the child genetically tested and to be informed about additional findings. Factors included: 1. benefits/hopes, 2. worries/concerns, 3. values and beliefs, 4. individual circumstances, and 5. emotional states. Conclusion Our work extends an existing empirical decision model of family decisions about genome sequencing to genetic testing in pediatrics in general, adding the categories “individual circumstances” and “emotional states”. The factors can be further integrated into the Health Belief Model; the importance of emotional states is reflected in dual-process theories, such as Fuzzy Trace Theory. Research is required on emotional states, differences between DT and PT, parents’ decisions about result disclosure, and dyadic variables as decision-making predictors. https://philarchive.org/rec/MERIAR-2 _Animals_ 14 (2896). 2024Simple Summary Are we morally justified in using animals in biomedical research and if so, how can we make sure that the experiments are conducted in a scientifically and morally acceptable manner? Based on our own experiences as scholars from various academic backgrounds, we argue that this question can only be answered as an interdisciplinary and international endeavor. Thus, our article aims to contribute to the foundation of the emerging field of animal research ethics, combining perspectives from research ethics, animal ethics, science, and law. In doing so, we describe the following seven phases that animal experiments typically run through: ethical, legal and social presumptions (phase 0), planning (phase I), review (phase II), conduct of experiments (phase III), publication/dissemination (phase IV), further exploitation of results (phase V), and evaluation (phase VI). Here, 20 key ethical, legal, and practical challenges are identified and analyzed that need to be addressed. Apart from challenges arising at the level of the experiments themselves, there are also so-called meta-challenges associated with animal research ethics as a field. Four of these are presented and further discussed, also in relation to their opportunities for the further development of animal research ethics that takes into account interdisciplinary and international perspectives. Abstract Can nonhuman animals be used for the benefit of humans in a scientifically and morally justified manner and, if yes, how? Based on our own experiences as scholars from various academic backgrounds, we argue that this question can only be answered as an interdisciplinary and international endeavor, considering insights from research ethics and animal ethics as well as scientific and legal aspects. The aim of this article is to contribute to the foundation of the emerging field of animal research ethics. In doing so, we describe the following seven phases of animal research experiments: ethical, legal and social presumptions (phase 0), planning (phase I), review (phase II), conduct of experiments (phase III), publication/dissemination (phase IV), further exploitation of results (phase V), and evaluation (phase VI). In total, 20 key ethical, legal, and practical challenges that an ethical framework for the use of animals in research needs to address are identified and analyzed. Finally, we characterize the following four meta-challenges and opportunities associated with animal research ethics as a field: (1) moral pluralism, (2) the integration of views and positions outside the laboratory, (3) international plurality of conduct, standards, and legal norms, and (4) interdisciplinary education. https://philarchive.org/rec/TRIARO-4 _AI and Society_ 40 (1):3. 2025Not Applicable (N/A)<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=TRIARO-4&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2F10.1007%2Fs00146-025-02251-8">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/REEAEA In Carolina Machado (ed.), _Ethics in Management and Business_. Springer. pp. 1-20. 2025Theodor W. Adorno was one of the twentieth century’s most potent and influential European thinkers, whose impact is felt across the humanities and social sciences. However, Adorno’s thought has been almost entirely absent from the business ethics conversation. This chapter explores the relevance of Adorno’s thought for business ethics that has emerged in recent scholarship. It does so through an engagement with topics such as positivistic management, consumer culture, social media and political discourse, and the possibility of good work, and by expounding Adorno’s critical theory, the critique of the business ethics tradition implied by his work, and the debate regarding whether Adorno can be read as a ‘negative Aristotelian’.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=REEAEA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Fchapter%2F10.1007%2F978-3-031-82054-0_1">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/JOYIEC-4 _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_ 103 (1):361-369. 2003According to Mellor, we know what an experience is like if we can imagine it correctly, and we will do so if we recognise the experience as it is imagined. This paper identifies a constraint on adequate accounts of how we ordinarily imagine experiences correctly: the capacities to imagine and to recognise the experience must be jointly operative at the point of forming an intention to imagine the experience. The paper develops an account of imagining experiences correctly that meets this constraint in terms of the subject's possession of a concept of the experience. The account implies that the imagination is active in conscious perception.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=JOYIEC-4&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Faristotelian%2Farticle-lookup%2Fdoi%2F10.1111%2Fj.0066-7372.2003.00077.x">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/HUAFVT _Religions_ 16 (3):268. 2025This paper challenges the conventional view that pre-Qin Confucianism represents kingly virtue politics that lacks institutional duty. By interpreting Xunzi’s notion of yi 義, particularly gong-yi 公義, as a form of public obligation, I show that Xunzi exposes yi to state institutions to oblige people to serve public ends. While institutional duty is often associated with post-Enlightenment political philosophy, this paper argues that Xunzi’s philosophy offers a comparable framework of public–private exchange. Xunzi’s gong-yi may be a public-servicing sense of duty that combines moral and civic dimensions, compelling individuals to cooperate for the collective good. Unlike social contract theories that trade private rights with public duties, Xunzi’s system relies on moral compulsion and normative reciprocity. This system posits a sensible exchange between individual duties from inner compulsion for the public good. By contrasting gong 公 (the public) with si 私 (the private), Xunzi envisions the public as an entity that is serviced through public duties and a place for human flourishing. Positioning the role of gong-yi in Xunzi’s broader institutional project crystalizes this nascent concept of a “public” and its relationships with civic duties. https://philarchive.org/rec/NGUPIF This study examines the dynamic relationship between face-saving mechanisms—proxied by age, income, and gender—and the peers’ safe-driving information on the driving behaviors of Chinese drivers. Using the Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) and Granular Interaction Thinking Theory (GITT) to analyze data from 1,039 Chinese drivers, we uncover a complex interplay of factors. Our findings suggest that peers serving as role models and actively supporting careful driving positively influence drivers’ safe driving behaviors. The effect of role-model peers is strengthened among drivers with higher age and income levels. In contrast, the impact of actively engaged peers is lower among these groups and male drivers (though the gender’s negative moderation effect is weakly reliable). These results highlight the crucial role of peer influence in promoting safe driving and underscore the dynamic effects of cultural values, particularly face-saving concerns, on drivers’ cognitive and behavioral processes in China. https://philarchive.org/rec/ALTNER _Australasian Journal of Philosophy_. forthcomingRecent years have seen a surge of interest in the topic of moral responsibility for ‘non-ideal’ agents. And yet, one important type of ‘non-ideal’ agent, the narcissistic agent, has not received much attention. In this paper, I seek to fill this gap. My focus is on psychological entitlement, a feature that has been largely overlooked. I argue that this feature impairs narcissistic agents’ moral competence. This is because it both causes them to form distorted moral assessments in a wide range of situations and impairs their ability to use feedback from others to correct these distortions. I conclude that narcissistic agents have mitigated responsibility owing to their impaired moral competence. As I furthermore show, this does not entail that we simply need to accept the damage they do. Rather, we may take steps to protect ourselves against the destructive effects of narcissistic entitlement, both on a personal and on a societal level. https://philarchive.org/rec/JAFVAH _Design Issues_ 31 (4):91-104. 2015 https://philarchive.org/rec/LUITPO-3 _Journal of Early Modern Christianity_ 11 (2):355-375. 2024George Berkeley’s (1685–1753) condemnation of freethinking arose from the social, political, and, above all, moral repercussions that he believed this heterogeneous group was bringing about in British society. In the first part of this paper, I set out the challenges posed by the freethinking movement, drawing extensively on Berkeley’s Alciphron. In the second part, I address both the reasons behind his aversion to freethinking and his response, which involved advocating for the union of Church and state and while rejecting secular governance. This analysis relies primarily on lesser-known works from Berkeley’s socio-political writings. The paper argues that Berkeley’s opposition to freethinkers was driven by his concern for the public good and his belief that the Christian religion, particularly in its Anglican tradition, was the most effective means to achieve it.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=LUITPO-3&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.degruyter.com%2Fdocument%2Fdoi%2F10.1515%2Fjemc-2024-2016%2Fpdf%3FlicenseType%3Drestricted%26srsltid%3DAfmBOoq0m1x_BCTfYQfzYvzogFIrv0CiSVw90ViIFOQo0peifzOLk2fd">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/CUIBTL _Dialogue_ 67 (1):1-7. 2024This essay critiques Donald Davidson's thesis in "What Metaphors Mean," which posits that metaphors convey only their literal meanings without hidden or additional layers of cognitive or figurative content. Davidson argues that metaphors function by evoking novel perspectives through the literal meanings of words, without involving any special meanings. This paper challenges Davidson's view by examining the limitations that arise when metaphors are modified or when synonymous terms are substituted, which often results in a loss of metaphorical effectiveness. The proposed theory introduces the concepts of "focus" and "lens" terms, emphasizing the role of cultural resonance in generating secondary meanings in metaphors. The lens term, with its rich cultural and historical associations, interacts with the focus term to produce meanings deeply embedded in cultural understanding. This theory addresses the shortcomings of Davidson's approach, offering a more comprehensive framework for understanding the function of metaphors in language. Future research directions are also suggested, including the exploration of cultural resonance across different cultures, the cognitive processes involved in metaphor interpretation, and the implications for artificial intelligence. This paper underscores the importance of cultural and historical contexts in metaphorical language, providing a robust understanding of the interplay between literal meanings and cultural associations. https://philarchive.org/rec/WYRTBA _Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology_. forthcomingFolk psychology's usefulness extends beyond its role in explaining and predicting behavior, i.e., beyond the intentional stance. In this paper, I critically examine the concept of phenomenal stance. According to this idea, attributions of phenomenal mental states impact laypeople's perception of moral patiency. The more phenomenal states we ascribe to others, the more we care about their well-being. The perception of moral patients—those affected by moral actions—is hypothesized to diverge from the perception of moral agents, those who perform moral actions. Despite its appeal, especially considering its exploration of the established relationship between folk psychology and moral cognition, the idea of the phenomenal stance faces significant challenges. It relies on laypeople recognizing the phenomenality of experience, yet experimental philosophy of consciousness suggests that there is no folk concept of phenomenal consciousness. Moreover, proponents of the phenomenal stance often conflate phenomenal states with emotional states despite the existence of both non-emotional conscious states and, arguably, non-conscious emotional states. Additionally, attributions of conscious mental states impact the perception of both moral agency and patiency. I report on experimental results indicating that some of these attributions lower the perceived moral patiency. Besides providing reasons to reject the idea of the phenomenal stance, I argue that the perception of moral patiency is guided by attributions of affective states (affects, emotions, moods). I call such attributions the affective stance and explore this concept’s relationship with empathy and other psychological concepts.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=WYRTBA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1037%2Fteo0000316">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/HUNPIA-3 _Journal of Public Policy_:1-23. 2025The police are required to establish probable cause before engaging in custodial interrogation. Much custodial interrogation relies on a fraudulent epistemic environment (FEE) in which the police knowingly use deception and dishonesty to gain an advantage over a suspect regarding a material issue, injuring the interests of the suspect. Probable cause, then, is a sort of evidentiary and epistemic standard that legally justifies the police’s use of deceptive and dishonest custodial interrogation tactics that are on par with fraud. However, there are both deontological and consequentialist considerations that show why the police’s use of an FEE is often unjustified. Accordingly, the paper argues that even if the use of an FEE is based on probable cause, there are other (non-epistemic) reasons to think evidence with probative value (such as a confession) should be excluded when derived from an FEE and there is no acute threat of harm to others.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=HUNPIA-3&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cambridge.org%2Fcore%2Fjournals%2Fjournal-of-public-policy%2Farticle%2Fpolice-interrogation-and-fraudulent-epistemic-environments%2F76D390855289DA8D7436219464A31F42">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/LASEEA-2 _European Journal for Philosophy of Science_. forthcomingExplanatory Essentialism (EE) is the view that a property is the essence of a kind because it causally explains the many properties that instances of that kind exhibit. This paper examines an application of EE to biological species, which I call Biological Explanatory Essentialism (BEE). BEE states that a particular biological origin is the essence of a species on the grounds that it causes certain organisms to display the group of properties the species is associated with. Evaluating BEE is important, as it offers a novel argument for biological essentialism—the contentious claim that biological species have essences. This paper critically assesses the empirical foundations of BEE, focusing on the presupposition that a single biological origin causes the many properties associated with the species in question. By discussing a case of cryptic species among five-toed jerboas within the Scarturus elater species complex, I challenge that presupposition, thereby arguing that cryptic species present a serious obstacle to BEE. I conclude that BEE fails to support biological essentialism and suggest that essentialist philosophers reconsider the role of causal-explanatory factors in accounting for the purported essences of biological species. These philosophers may need to explore alternatives beyond such factors, one of which I briefly outline. https://philarchive.org/rec/VONOTA _NanoEthics_ 19 (2):online. 2025The concepts of technological and innovation sovereignty open a pathway to address existing gaps in the governance of technology and innovation. Technological sovereignty aims to embed socio-political objectives within the development of technology and innovation, affecting economic governance and providing directionality of technological capacities. In this article, the concepts of technological and innovation sovereignty will be elaborated against the background of the paradigms of nation-state governance of technology, modern market-innovation and responsible innovation.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=VONOTA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1007%2Fs11569-025-00469-w">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/BELTMO-20 _Philosophy Compass_. forthcomingPregnancy is a one of the most complex phenomena of life and is essential to the life cycle of mammals. Pregnancy is also a crucial aspect of humans’ life and experience. But what is pregnancy? This question has received little attention in philosophy until recently, when it got picked up by metaphysicians and philosophers of science. However, the philosophical discussion is still in its infancy. This article provides a survey of the recent debate on the metaphysics of pregnancy. It explores the relation between the pregnant organism and the gestated one, motivating the further study of pregnancy from a philosophical perspective (§1, §2). It summarises the three main models of pregnancy present in the literature, the containment view (§3), the parthood view (§4) and the splitting process view (§5) with their advantages and shortcomings. Then, it explores a recent debate on whether pregnancy is a disease (§6). Lastly, it considers how one can decide between these models, for instance by favouring a given view of biological individuality over another (§7). The article concludes that none of the views is fully satisfactory, and thus inviting to continue the research on pregnancy from a metaphysical and philosophical perspective. https://philarchive.org/rec/OXTEIT _Journal of Interdisciplinary Music Studies_ 10:1-16. 2020Empiricist views of depth perception isolate forms of experience with implications for embodied cognitive science, psychoacoustics, and musical performance, including experience of perception in multiple modalities, and experience of bodily movement. Continuity between empiricism and embodied cognitive science suggests that such forms of experience are important for understanding spatial perception in further research. This paper also discusses implications of embodied views of auditory depth perception for spatial aspects of aesthetic experience and musical performance, like “feeling surrounded by sound”. https://philarchive.org/rec/SKESEI Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics is one of the most important and influential works in the history of moral philosophy. The Methods of Ethics clarifies and tackles some of the most enduring and difficult problems of morality. It offers readers a high-calibre example of analytical moral philosophy. This Element interprets and critically evaluates select positions and arguments in Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics. It focuses specifically on Sidgwick's moral epistemology, his argument against common-sense morality, his argument for utilitarianism, his argument for rational egoism, and his argument for what he calls 'the dualism of practical reason', the thesis that utilitarianism and rational egoism are coordinate but conflicting requirements of rationality. Sidgwick's Ethics attempts to acquaint readers with the scholarly and theoretical debates relating to Sidgwick's theses, while providing readers with a greater appreciation of the depth and sophistication of Sidgwick's masterpiece.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=SKESEI&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cambridge.org%2Fcore%2Felements%2Fsidgwicks-ethics%2F22B8B3653C8394B2A67457484333FE3D">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/FREETB-4 _Synthese_ 205 (1):1-33. 2025Manifold learning and effective model building are generally viewed as fundamentally different types of procedure. After all, in one we build a simplified model of the data, in the other, we construct a simplified model of the another model. Nonetheless, I argue that certain kinds of high-dimensional effective model building, and effective field theory construction in quantum field theory, can be viewed as special cases of manifold learning. I argue that this helps to shed light on all of these techniques. First, it suggests that the effective model building procedure depends upon a certain kind of algorithmic compressibility requirement. All three approaches assume that real-world systems exhibit certain redundancies, due to regularities. The use of these regularities to build simplified models is essential for scientific progress in many different domains.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=FREETB-4&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2F10.1007%2Fs11229-024-04844-0">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/FRESMR-2 _Erkenntnis_ 90 (2):645-673. 2025The “sloppy models” program originated in systems biology, but has seen applications across a range of fields. Sloppy models are dependent on a large number of parameters, but highly insensitive to the vast majority of parameter combinations. Sloppy models proponents claim that the program may explain the success of science. I argue that the sloppy models program can at best provide a very partial explanation. Drawing a parallel with renormalization group realism, I argue that it would only give us grounds for a minimal kind of scientific realism. Nonetheless, the program can offer certain epistemic virtues.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=FRESMR-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2F10.1007%2Fs10670-023-00728-w">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/LIEPOC This paper explores the striking conceptual parallel between contemporary accounts of episodic memory (see e.g. Addis, De Brigard, Michaelian) and picture semantics (Greenberg, Abusch, Maier). It argues that picture semantics captures many familiar distinctions from philosophy of memory, while providing some additional – highly useful – tools and concepts (e.g. a mechanism for representation-to-content conversion and a general notion of situation that is independent of a given perspective). The paper uses these tools to (re-)structure and advance debate in contemporary philosophy of memory. Specifically, it (i) shows how these tools can be employed to defend the propositional nature of episodic memory contents, (ii) gives a sophisticated account of non-actual and non-particular episodic memory objects, and (iii) provides a new argument for pluralism about accuracy concepts and standards. Along the way, it defends a liberal version of the pictorial view of mnemic imagery, reveals faithfulness about accuracy as a (very) weak variant of radical authenticism, and explains different intuitions about the possibility of observer-perspective memories from dreams. The paper closes by suggesting, inversely, the import of these applications for picture semantics. https://philarchive.org/rec/JONOIT _Philosophical Studies_. forthcomingThis paper explores the view that the vocabulary of metaphysical fundamentality is opaque, using Sider’s theory of structure as a motivating case study throughout. Two conceptions of fundamentality are distinguished, only one of which can explain why the vocabulary of fundamentality is opaque. https://philarchive.org/rec/FLOIRA-2 _Episteme_. forthcomingIdentity-protective reasoning---motivated reasoning driven by defending a social identity---is often dismissed as a paradigm of epistemic vice and a key driver of democratic dysfunction. Against this view, I argue that identity-protective reasoning can play a positive epistemic role, both individually and collectively. Collectively, it facilitates an effective division of cognitive labor by enabling groups to test divergent beliefs, serving as an epistemic insurance policy against the possibility that the total evidence is misleading. Individually, it can correct for the distortions that arise from taking ideologically skewed evidence at face value. This is particularly significant for members of marginalized groups, who frequently encounter evidence that diminishes the value of their identities, beliefs, and practices. For them, identity-protective reasoning can counter dominant ideological ignorance and foster resistant standpoint development. While identity-protective reasoning is not without risks, its application from marginalized and counter-hegemonic positions carries epistemic benefits crucial in democracies threatened by elite capture. Against dominant views in contemporary political epistemology and psychology, identity-protective reasoning should be reconceived as a resource to be harnessed and not a problem to be eradicated. https://philarchive.org/rec/BUTTDW _Nordic Journal of Dance_ 15 (2):100-110. 2024In the 2023 intergenerational dance project Superpower Ensemble, the participants were chosen for their individual qualities to form a greater ‘we’ as a group. The children added spontaneity and playfulness, whereas the adult artists inspired the children with their artistic practice, professionalism, and direction. In this article, we aim to describe the subtle processes a choreographer initiates to achieve the intended aesthetic and ethical results. Our case story is Superpower Ensemble, and the theme investigated through the case story is ‘we-ness’. By describing these processes and this theme, we seek to demonstrate some of the manifold forms of knowledge possessed by dancers, choreographers, and artists. Their practically gained expertise in being, being together, and being in the world has the potential to reach far beyond the artistic realm. Their findings align with academic insights into metaphysical, philosophical realms. To show the latter, we outline certain theoretical and philosophical discoveries that reinforce the findings unearthed and explored through the bodily–affective dance work in Superpower Ensemble.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=BUTTDW&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.academia.edu%2F127517350%2FThe_Dancing_We">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/RSNWNC _Journal of Medical Ethics_. forthcomingLee argues that pronatalist policies in countries suffering from declining birth rates, such as South Korea, are ethically flawed.1 The ‘soft’ pronatalist policies Lee describes aim at persuading citizens to reproduce. For Lee, coercive pronatalist policies are so obviously unacceptable as not to merit consideration. However, we suggest that this is an issue that requires further analysis. When ethicists regard certain possibilities as not worth debating, we miss opportunities to examine the basis for our convictions. In short, it behoves us now and again to challenge our convictions, especially if they seem inconsistent in relation to other views we hold. By comparing coercive pronatalism with enforced military conscription, we can notice some inconsistencies. South Korea—which Lee discusses in her paper—enforces military service, as do Austria, Switzerland, Ukraine and Finland to name a few. Many countries that do not currently conscript citizens retain the right to do so during wartime. Conscription is an example of coercive state intervention which, even if not widely endorsed, rarely generates outrage or even attention from ethicists.2 For those who accept that coercive conscription could in principle be justified, it is not easy to show why coercive pronatalism must be rejected without argument. Indeed, many of those who are alarmed about declining birth rates …<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=RSNWNC&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fjme.bmj.com%2Flookup%2Fdoi%2F10.1136%2Fjme-2025-110705">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/VARTRO-10 The Ruse of Techne offers a reappraisal of Heidegger’s entire work by focusing on the forms of activity he regards as separate from instrumentality. Non-instrumental activities like authenticity, poetry, and thinking—in short, the ineffectual—are critical for Heidegger as they offer the only path to the truth of being throughout his work. By unearthing the source of the conception of non-instrumental action in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, Vardoulakis elaborates how it forms part of Heidegger’s response to an old problem, namely, how to account for difference after positing a single and unified being that is not amenable to change. He further demonstrates that an action without ends and effects leads to an ethics and politics rife with difficulties and contradictions that only become starker when compared to other responses to the same problem that we find in the philosophical tradition and which rely on instrumentality. Heidegger’s conception of an action without ends or effect forgets the role of instrumentality in the tradition that posits a single, unified being. And yet, the ineffectual has had a profound influence in how continental philosophy determines the ethical and the political since World War II. The critique of the ineffectual in Heidegger is thus effectively a critique of the conception of praxis in continental philosophy. Vardoulakis proposes that it is urgent to undo the forgetting of instrumentality if we are to conceive of a democratic politics and an ethics fit to respond to the challenges of high capitalism.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=VARTRO-10&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.fordhampress.com%2F9781531506759%2Fthe-ruse-of-techne%2F">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/FLABNI-2 ​This book, itself a study of two books on the Baroque, proposes a pair of related theses: one interpretive, the other argumentative. The first, enveloped in the second, holds that the significance of allegory Gilles Deleuze recognized in Walter Benjamin’s 1928 monograph on seventeenth century drama is itself attested in key aspects of Kantian, Leibnizian, and Platonic philosophy. The second, enveloping the first, is a literalist claim about predication itself – namely, that the aesthetics of agitation and hallucination so emblematic of the Baroque sensibility adduces an avowedly metaphysical ‘naturalism’ in which thought is replete with predicates. Oriented by Barbara Cassin’s development of the concerted sense in which homonyms are critically distinct from synonyms, the philosophical claim here is that ‘the Baroque’ names the intervallic [διαστηματική] relation that thought establishes between things. On this account, any subject finds its unity in a concerted state of disquiet – a state-rempli in which, phenomenologically speaking, experience comprises as much seeing as reading.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=FLABNI-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Fbook%2F10.1007%2F978-3-030-66398-8">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/SERLFT This chapter from Michel Serres’s comprehensive study on Leibniz—"The System of Leibniz and its Mathematical Models [Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques]"—examines Leibniz’s epistemological framework. This framework, which Leibniz developed for a large part in his “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas [Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis],” is juxtaposed against Descartes’s "Meditations on First Philosophy [Meditationes de Prima Philosophia]" and the method of systematic doubt developed therein. While Descartes rejects any knowledge with the slightest possibility of falsehood, Leibniz accepts knowledge with even a minimal degree of truth. Leibniz’s approach involves a progressive genesis of truth through a series of filters, each further refining knowledge. This process is intrinsically linked to infinitism and combinatorics, allowing for a gradual differentiation of the distinct from the indistinct. The filters are applied sequentially, with each filter proceeding through its own oppositions, resulting in a spectrum of knowledge ranging from obscure to clear, confused to distinct, inadequate to adequate, and symbolic to intuitive. This framework facilitates pluralism within rationalism that proceeds through evolving or regional truths. The filters overlap, and only the final stage of knowledge is devoid of mixture. Leibniz’s epistemology is non-Cartesian, as it relativizes truth and falsehood at each stage of the filtering process. It also accounts for the limitations of sensory perception, attributing them to the imperfection of the human mind in its current state. (Translated by Martijn Boven) https://philarchive.org/rec/SUITEO In William John Morgan (ed.), _Ethics in Sport_. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. pp. 9--19. 2007<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=SUITEO&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fbooks.google.com%2Fbooks%3Fhl%3Den%26lr%3D%26id%3Dvu6I7HDa5W0C%26oi%3Dfnd%26pg%3DPA9%26ots%3DzVrMNKsHha%26sig%3DJR97c1fk6YAQn60GWjZAe9WAlwE">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/MAYEFA-2 _Journal of Moral Philosophy_. forthcomingMoral arguments against the consumption of animal products from factory farms are traditionally categorical. The conclusions require people to eliminate from their diets all animal products (veganism), all animal flesh (vegetarianism), all animals except seafood (pescetarianism), etc. An alternative “reducetarian” approach prescribes progressive reduction in one's consumption of animal products, not categorical abstention. We articulate a much-needed moral defense of this more ecumenical approach. We start with a presumptive case in favor of reducetarianism before moving on to address three objections—that it falls short of our obligations to address such an egregious practice, is a rationalization of the status quo, and cannot fix systemic injustices in animal agriculture. We conclude that reducetarianism is a defensible approach for many people and is a promising route to moral progress on factory farming.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=MAYEFA-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.joshdmay.com%2Fwp-content%2Fmedia%2Fmay-kumar-defense-of-reducetarianism.pdf">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/HALDID-4 _Journal of Somaesthetics_. forthcomingThis article, composed six months after the Oct. 7th Hamas operation “Al-Aqsa Flood,” in the shadow of Israel’s retaliatory genocide, was catalyzed by a viral social media video with alternating clips of Palestinian and Native American people dancing in defiant resistance to ongoing white settler colonial ethnic cleansing and genocide, in loving embrace of their own Indigenous ways of being. After an introductory setting of the stage for this video, the first section rehearses the two historical chapters of dance scholar Jacqueline Shea Murphy’s The People Have Always Danced, emphasizing the paradoxical late nineteenth-century campaigns (1) criminalizing Indigenous American dances, and (2) appropriating these dances and dancers for non-Indigenous audiences. The second section then pivots to Australian choreographer Nicholas Rowe’s Raising Dust: A Cultural History of Dance in Palestine, emphasizing the appropriation of a traditional shepherd dance (Dabke) into the Zionist project of fabricating an orientalist tradition to justify their colonization. Finally, the concluding section spotlights Palestine’s Birzeit University and the El-Funoun folkdance troupe as exemplars, captured in the Palestinian hip hop song’s neologism “Palest-Indians,” of loving Indigenous death-defying dance resistance. https://philarchive.org/rec/HAUFFA _Https://Www.Academia.Edu/127830770/Factory_Farming_and_Animal_Ethics_a_Moral_Dilemma_. 2025This paper critically examines the ethical implications of animal suffering in industrial farming and transport, focusing on the utilitarian justification of industrial agriculture and the failure of EU animal welfare regulations. Particular attention is given to Denmark’s role as one of Europe’s largest meat and dairy exporters, where so-called "high welfare" standards mask the reality of systemic cruelty. The paper argues that utilitarian ethics have enabled mass suffering by prioritizing economic efficiency over individual animal well-being. It calls for a shift toward rights-based and virtue ethics approaches and outlines concrete policy reforms to end the worst abuses in animal farming. Additionally, it highlights the impact of stress on animal health and the resulting unhealthy meat, making the case for more humane and sustainable farming practices.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=HAUFFA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.academia.edu%2F127830770%2FFactory_Farming_and_Animal_Ethics_A_Moral_Dilemma">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/CASTRT-4 _Neuroethics_ 18 (16):1-21. 2025In this article I present a characterization of the right to mental integrity (RMI), expanding and refining the definition proposed by Ienca and Andorno’s (Life Science Society Policy 13 5, 2017) and clarifying how the scope of this right should be shaped in cases of cognitive extension (EXT). In doing so, I will first critically survey the different formulations of the RMI presented in the literature. I will then argue that the RMI protects from i) nonconsensual interferences that ii) bypass reasoning and iii) produce mental harm. Contrary to other definitions proposed in the literature, my formulation disentangles the RMI from the right to cognitive liberty (RCL) (Lavazza in Frontiers Neuroscience 12 82, 2018), the right to mental privacy (RMP) (Lavazza and Giorgi in Neuroethics 16 (1): 1-13, 2023), and the right to psychological continuity (RPC) (Zohny et al. in Neuroethics 16: 20, 2023), thus enabling a fine-grained assessment of their simultaneous or individual violation. Finally, I analyse how the extended mind thesis (EXT) reshapes the scope of the RMI, proposing a layered protection of extended mental integrity, which grants stronger protection to the organism-bound cognitive system and self in case of manipulative influences of the mind-extending device. To conclude, I present a variety of neurorights violations and mental harms inflicted to organism-bound and cognitively extended agents.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=CASTRT-4&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2F10.1007%2Fs12152-025-09585-6">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/RYATEO-17 _Journal of Medical Ethics_. forthcomingSemaglutide, sold under the brand names of Ozempic, Rybelsus and Wegovy, is one of the most popular drugs on the market. Manufactured by Novo Nordisk, semaglutide is the newest in a family of glucagon-like peptide-1 receptor agonists used most commonly to treat type II diabetes. To date, the results of semaglutide for the treatment of type II diabetes have been overwhelmingly positive. It is for the drug’s effects on appetite suppression and weight loss, however, that have led its surge in popularity, with many hailing semaglutide as the new ‘miracle drug for weight loss’. Despite its popularity, both the governmental and popular reception to the drug has largely been mixed. In this paper, we address a range of ethical concerns and argue that while many are legitimate, they do not provide conclusive reason not to prescribe semaglutide for weight loss.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=RYATEO-17&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fjme.bmj.com%2Flookup%2Fdoi%2F10.1136%2Fjme-2024-110374">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/THAHCT _Philosophia Scientiae_ 29-29 (1):137-150. 2025The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Crisis) marks the culmination of Husserl’s Genetic Phenomenology and the beginning of a new philosophy of science, one that viewed science not as a fact but as a problem that needed philosophical understanding. For Husserl, the crisis of Galilean Science is born out of the severance of its relation to the life-world and the erroneous identification of “Nature” with its constituted mathematical or quantifiable object. In the phenomenological philosophy of science, science is a tradition formed through human praxis, like any other cultural enterprise. Objectivity in scientific praxis is a regulative principle constituted by the consensus of judgements of the scientific community. The continuity of scientific knowledge shows in its unity of propagated transference of meaning, the sedimentation of which is carried through language. Despite the scientific world being ontologically grounded in the life-world, Husserl sought to preserve the autonomy of both worlds. To fully appreciate the implications of Husserl’s contribution to the philosophy of science, this paper identifies the ‘spatial turn’ that Husserl brought in through his “less mathematical, more physical” notion of life-world with the 90° shift in the social studies of science that Latour proposed. The life-world fuses “Nature” and “Society” as one ontological entity that gives rise to science, moving away from a one-dimensional science that kept the ontology of science grounded in one of those poles alone. Despite the limits of Husserlian phenomenological epistemology, Crisis radically departed from positivism, the then-official philosophy of science, embracing historicity and language to broaden our discourse on science and even coming close to certain later developments in Philosophy of Science. Husserl’s meditations on spatiality also urged a transition to the contemporary understanding of space, opening possibilities of dialogue with Foucault.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=THAHCT&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fjournals.openedition.org%2Fphilosophiascientiae%2F4605">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/YOREOH _Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture_. forthcomingIn Turkey, city hospitals play a significant role in the provision of healthcare services. This survey looked at the level of satisfaction with various hospitals. In the study, social media was one of the tools. The hospitals' websites were used to compile satisfaction ratings. After that, content analysis was used to look at the hospitals' indicators for technological, communicative, and physical quality. The study considered hospitals with 1200 beds or greater as a sampling factor in hospital selection. Hospitals are classified with the designation "Hospital" in objectives of information security and ethics. Encoding was carried out like Hos1, Hos2, Hos3, etc. for every hospital. The results of this article, which are considered significant research findings, are believed to had an important effect on improving hospital service requirements. Additionally, improvements can be made in health service delivery in line with the opinions of stakeholders. Additionally, the importance of patient satisfaction in terms of health tourism was emphasized.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=YOREOH&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fesiculture.com%2Findex.php%2Fesiculture%2Farticle%2Fview%2F1092">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/EMETIT In Brynn F. Welch (ed.), _The art of teaching philosophy: reflective values and concrete practices_. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 111-118. 2024Paolo Freire argued that trust is essential to what he called the “problem-posing” model of education. This chapter builds on that insight and explores different ways that trust plays out in the classroom, focusing on three different types. The first type of trust is from teacher to student – trusting that students will show up prepared and ready to do the work together. The second type of trust is from student to teacher – trusting that the method and design of the course (from the assignment structure to story arc of the topics and texts) will be coherent and worthwhile. The final type of trust is that which emerges holistically, in which what Freire called the teacher-student and student-teachers build a trustful epistemic community together.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=EMETIT&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bloomsbury.com%2Fus%2Fart-of-teaching-philosophy-9781350404816%2F">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/KODHAO _Mind_ 20:fzae073. 2025Critiques the higher-order hyperintensional theory developed by Cian Dorr in "To be F as to be G" as an exercise in overfitting.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=KODHAO&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Facademic.oup.com%2Fmind%2Fadvance-article-abstract%2Fdoi%2F10.1093%2Fmind%2Ffzae073%2F8030270">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/BLOAWO In Green Mitchell & Michel Jan (eds.), _William Lycan on Mind, Meaning, and Method_. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 43-66. 2024 https://philarchive.org/rec/SCHSPA-37 In Ori Beck (ed.), _The relational view of perception: new philosophical essays_. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 45-82. 2025Perception is to its core perspectival: we perceive our surrounding from a location, under specific lighting and acoustic conditions and other such perceptual conditions. Due to the perspectival nature of perception, any case of perception can have both variant and invariant properties. While the variant properties alter with changes in perceptual conditions, the invariant properties remain stable regardless of such changes. What is the nature of these variant and invariant properties? Are they properties in our environment? Are they properties of perceptual consciousness? By explaining the variant and invariant aspect of perceptual consciousness in terms of representations of external, mind-independent properties in our environment, this paper furthers an externalist account of perceptual consciousness. In doing so, it breaks with a long tradition—still alive today—of analyzing perspectival variance purely in terms of mind-dependent appearance properties. Perceptual variance is a key aspect of our subjective perspective and our egocentric point of view. The offered analysis of perspectival variance provides an explanation for how perspectival variance characterizes the subjective perspective of any perceiver—be it a dolphin, snake, or human. https://philarchive.org/rec/MACPPA-19 This book explores the nature and significance of Pyrrhonism, the most prominent and influential form of skepticism in Western philosophy. Not only did Pyrrhonism play an important part in the philosophical scene of the Hellenistic and Imperial age, but it also had a tremendous impact on Renaissance and modern philosophy and continues to be a topic of lively discussion among both scholars of ancient philosophy and epistemologists. The focus and inspiration of the book is the brand of Pyrrhonism expounded in the extant works of Sextus Empiricus. Its aim is twofold: to offer a critical interpretation of some of the central aspects of Sextus’s skeptical outlook and to examine certain debates in contemporary philosophy from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective. The first part explores the aim of skeptical inquiry, the defining features of Pyrrhonian argumentation, the epistemic challenge posed by the Modes of Agrippa, and the Pyrrhonist’s stance on the requirements of rationality. The second part focuses on present-day discussions of the epistemic significance of disagreement, the limits of self-knowledge, and the nature of rationality. The book will appeal to researchers and graduate students interested in skepticism.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=MACPPA-19&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.springer.com%2Fgp%2Fbook%2F9783030912093">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/CUNPSA versity is full of all manner of public activity: students talking, reading, dozing, playing cards; tables representing a wide variety of ethnic communities and clubs advertising their functions, soliciting membership, and serving as gathering places; and—~most directly related to the topic of this essay—students advocating mainly radical political causes, passing out material exposing and denouncing putative (and more often than not correctly imputed) wrongdoings by authorities ranging from the university administration to the federal government and beyond. It is true that both university officials and students making use of this space count on its campus setting to informally discourage use of it by other than students, but the space admits of an indefinite variety of uses, and at least no members of the.. https://philarchive.org/rec/GUGDIT-2 _Romano-Arabica_ 23:49-76. 2024We present a statistical analysis of the realization of definiteness in Tunisian Arabic (TA) texts written in Arabizi, a hybrid system reflecting some features of TA phonetics (assimilation), but also showing orthographic features, as the use of arithmographs. In §1, we give an overview of definiteness in TA from a semantic and syntactic point of view. In §2 we outline a typology of definite articles and show that TA normally marks definiteness with articles or similar devices, but also presents zero-markings or weak definites. In §3 we discuss TA and how definiteness is instantiated in TA. In §4, we present data from the Tunisian Arabizi Corpus (TAC), a multidisciplinary work with a hybrid approach based on dialectological questions, corpus linguistics standards, and deep learning techniques. In §5 we define the behavior of TA with respect to what we observed in §1, §2 and §3, describing our TAC-based analysis.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=GUGDIT-2&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fjournals.unibuc.ro%2Findex.php%2Froar%2Farticle%2Fview%2F794">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/NARKLA In Matthew C. Altman (ed.), _The Palgrave Kant Handbook_. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 21-47. 2017 https://philarchive.org/rec/KRYOOG _Economic Forum_ 14 (3):35-49. 2024Global challenges have created problems for export companies due to the growing threats of the market environment, which requires such companies to adopt a survival strategy and apply appropriate strategic methods to successfully counteract emerging global challenges. The purpose of the article is to update knowledge on how global challenges affect the sustainability of export companies and how strategies adopted by companies counteract the negative impact of global challenges. The methodological basis for obtaining the results of the study was factual analysis, logical and structural analysis, strategic analysis, analysis of cause and effect, and generalisation. The article critically analyses the existing theoretical concepts for explaining the impact of modern global challenges on export companies in order to reveal strategies for their survival in the face of uncertainty in the current market environment. Their further review revealed critical global challenges for export companies, which were classified according to the signs of their typification. Namely basic elements, sources of formation, thematic areas of influence, duration of influence, degree of implementation and nature of influence. The application of a strategic analysis of global challenges of export companies by thematic areas revealed possible causes of their emergence and consequences of their impact on the activities of export companies. In particular, it was found that export companies have the potential for negative impact of political and economic challenges, positive impact of technological and socio-cultural challenges, as well as neutral potential for legal and environmental challenges. The author proposes strategies for the survival of export companies under the influence of modern challenges, which should be focused on to obtain results that will ensure the sustainability of such companies in the future. The practical significance of the results lies in the fact that the main scientific provisions have been brought to the level of recommendations that can be used by managers of export companies to clarify the problems and promising areas of development of export activities.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=KRYOOG&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fe-forum.com.ua%2Fen%2Fjournals%2Ftom-14-3-2024%2Foglyad-globalnikh-viklikiv-i-strategiy-vizhivannya-eksportnikh-kompaniy">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/DIHPAA _Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology_. forthcomingThis paper examines Edmund Husserl's revised account of expression in his 1913–1914 revisions of the Logical Investigations. Rejecting the Investigations’ thesis that linguistic meanings are constituted in a distinctive class of essentially non-intuitive meaning intentions, Husserl develops a new conception of empty intention, a new analysis of the intuitively fulfilled discourse and a phenomenology of the indicative tendency. While these revisions have been acknowledged, their motivation, connection, and significance remain under-explored in the existing literature. By comparing the Investigations and the Revisions, this paper shows how these developments fundamentally alter Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between language, thought, and intuition. The revised account of expression illuminates the dynamic interaction of these elements in the process of meaning-making, offering a balanced account of the interplay of presence and absence in our use of words.<div>(<a href="https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=DIHPAA&amp;proxyId=&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.tandfonline.com%2Fdoi%2Ffull%2F10.1080%2F00071773.2025.2458310">direct link</a>)</div> https://philarchive.org/rec/HENTPM-2 Panqualityism is a form of panpsychism that distinguishes between conscious subjects (i.e., minds) and phenomenal qualities. Like panpsychism, it holds that the universe's physical ultimates are phenomenally qualitied. Unlike panpsychism, however, it argues that these phenomenally qualitied ultimates are not microsubjects and are therefore not experienced. By rejecting the idea that phenomenally qualitied ultimates are microsubjects, panqualityism escapes the subject combination problem. However, this creates a new challenge: explaining how conscious macrosubjects arise from non-experiential microqualities. Here I address this challenge by proposing a trialistic form of panqualityism. According to this view, unexperienced phenomenally qualitied ultimates are the dual aspects of physical ultimates. These qualitied ultimates obey a distinct set of physics-like laws, which govern their structural organization in the mental realm. The third fundamental ontological category in trialistic panqualityism-alongside physical and phenomenal ultimates-is that of conscious subjects (minds). These are proposed to be irreducible entities that strongly emerge from an ensemble of physical ultimates when specific physical conditions are met; they experience the quality macrostructures formed from the phenomenal ultimates that are the duals of the physical ultimates in the ensemble.