Stebbing's Wittgenstein

Abstract

Susan Stebbing wrote only once on Wittgenstein, in her paper 'Logical Positivism and Analysis' (1933). The paper was unusually critical of Wittgenstein. It put the Cambridge analytic philosophy of Moore and Russell in a sharp opposition to the positivist philosophy of the Vienna Circle, in which Stebbing included Wittgenstein. Whereas the positivists were interested in analysing language, the Cambridge realists were analysing facts. To be more explicit, the analytic philosophers were engaged in directional analysis, which seeks to illuminate (to elucidate) the multiplicity of the analysed facts. In contrast, positivists aimed at a final analysis that proves that there are simples. Stebbing's sympathies were clearly on the side of the Cambridge realists. The important implication of Stebbing's paper was that it urged Wittgenstein to change the style of his philosophy, abandoning those points which allegedly connected him with the Vienna Circle.

Keywords:

Directional analysis, elucidation, facts, metaphysics, G. E. Moore, Russell, Stebbing, John Wisdom, Wittgenstein

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1. Introduction: Two Kinds of Analytic Philosophy

In 1904 Lizzie Susan Stebbing (1885–1943) matriculated in History at Cambridge University, after which 'she took the first part of the Moral Sciences Tripos at Cambridge. Then [in 1908] she moved to King's College London to take an MA in Moral Science, graduating in 1912' (Beaney and Chapman 2022). After she published her *A Modern Introduction to Logic* in 1930, Stebbing enjoyed considerable authority among Anglophone philosophers. In 1930 she received an appointment at Bedford College, London. In the winter semester 1931–2 Stebbing

was a visiting professor at Columbia University, lecturing on Mathematical Logic and Contemporary Metaphysics (Chapman 2013, p. 65). Early in 1933, she was elected professor at Bedford College, London, becoming the first woman to be a professor in philosophy in the UK, and President of the Aristotelian Society. In the summer of the same year Stebbing co-founded the journal *Analysis*, hatched as something like an 'official organ' of the emerging analytic philosophy.

The only work in which Stebbing extensively discussed Wittgenstein was her paper 'Logical Positivism and Analysis'. It was delivered to the British Academy as a Henriette Hertz lecture on March 22, 1933, and published in the same year in a book form. Stebbing's general assessment of Wittgenstein was essentially negative. Subsequently, Wittgenstein's name appeared neither in Stebbing's *Thinking to Some Purpose* (1939) nor in *A Modern Elementary Logic* (1943). It should be noted, however, that before 1933, Stebbing was not really against Wittgenstein. In *A Modern Introduction to Logic* (1930) she referred to Wittgenstein four times, while *Tractatus* 3.3, 'Only the proposition has sense, only in the context of a proposition has a name a meaning', is the motto of Chapter IV on 'Propositions and their constituents'.

To start with our analysis of Stebbing's criticism of Wittgenstein, in the first decades after the First World War one usually spoke about the early Cambridge analytic philosophy as the philosophy of the English realists. While the old metaphysics, for example, that of McTaggart, explored the ultimate nature of the world and because of this was of necessity systematic, the new realists G. E. Moore and Russell studied the phenomena of the world. Their metaphysics was pluralistic (atomistic), developed piecemeal, step by step. The analysts recognised one authority only, the reality with which we are directly acquainted.

In 'Logical Positivism and Analysis', Stebbing found a new opponent of the Cambridge realists. She was anxious to distinguish not merely between Cambridge realists and British idealists, but between the former, on one hand, and Wittgenstein and the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle, on the other. Stebbing insisted that the analysis practiced by the Cambridge realists is not to be confused with the 'logical (language) analyses' of Wittgenstein and the 'Viennese Circle'. Arguably, she saw the latter as a product of a non-British tradition in philosophy that has its roots on the Continent.[1]

Stebbing put Wittgenstein so close to the Vienna Circle that she decided to explicate Wittgenstein's philosophical views of 1929–1932 by analysing the papers of the Vienna Circle (1933, pp. 53 ff.). To be sure, this was a judicious decision. The published views of the philosophers of the Logical Positivists of the time seemed really close to those of Wittgenstein, so much so that in the summer of 1932, the latter was afraid that when he would publish his long-prepared 'new book' (eventually, it appeared posthumously as *Philosophical Investigations*), he would be found guilty of plagiarism. This is well-documented in a letter to Carnap on August 20, 1932 (Nedo 2012, p. 300) in which Wittgenstein accused Carnap—to be more explicit, he meant here 'Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft' (1931)—of using many of Wittgenstein's own ideas without acknowledgement. As a matter of fact, this article of Carnap's was the one discussed at the greatest length (on 9 pages, out of 35) in Stebbing's 'Logical Positivism and Analysis' (1933, pp. 69–77).

In this connection, it deserves notice that starting from January 1929, Wittgenstein was back in Cambridge, so the interest towards his philosophy in England grew. Unfortunately, he published nothing but (1929). At the same time, the publication of the Vienna Circle manifesto in 1929, which openly declared that Wittgenstein was its master, had an amazing *succès de scandale*, and this mainly due to its mantra that the pursuit of metaphysics is nonsense. In fact, Stebbing's paper came to clear up this development.

Stebbing was critical to Wittgenstein till the end of her days. When she was evacuated in Cambridge University in 1939, after the Second World War started, she wrote in a letter: ' "I am sad that philosophy in Cambridge has sunk so low." [And] she was not coy about attributing blame for this deterioration: "Wittgenstein has, in my opinion, done more harm than good." ' (Chapman 2013, p. 148)

2. Differences Between Moore and Wittgenstein–Vienna Circle

Susan Stebbing first task was to trace down the difference between G. E. Moore, on one hand, and Wittgenstein and his Vienna acolytes, on the other. Both were convinced that the clarification of thoughts has priority in philosophy. From this point on, however, they went in different directions. First and foremost, Wittgenstein maintained that we can only clarify our thinking when we rightly understand the logic of language. This means that he, like the

Logical Positivists, was interested above all in language, not in facts. In contrast, Moore was interested in facts, which he indeed investigated by analysing philosophers' propositions.[2]

One implication of Wittgenstein's stress on clarifying language through the resources of the 'new logic' was the policy he followed of making everything clear in one step.[3] In contrast, Stebbing was adamant that the process of clarification is to proceed piecemeal, step by step. This clue was supported by Moore's insistence that there are degrees of understanding. Stebbing's conclusion was that 'it is a grave mistake to suppose that the alternatives are understanding, on one hand, and simply not understanding, on the other. We understand more or less clearly' (1933, p. 81) and then reflect on what we had understood in the process of analysis.

In short, Stebbing's defence of the piecemeal, step-by-step analysis played a central role in her attack on Wittgenstein. More precisely, it took the form of criticism of the flawless (*lückenlose*), exhaustive analysis from the perspective of Moore's philosophy of common sense. Stebbing namely insisted that 'we can understand a sentence (i.e., know how to use it correctly) without knowing what its correct analysis is' (1938/9, p. 77).

3. Where did the Difference between Moore and Wittgenstein–Vienna Circle Come From?

But why were Moore, on one hand, and Wittgenstein and his friends in Vienna, on the other hand, so different from one another? There are good reasons to suppose that this disparity was an implication of Frege's influence on Wittgenstein and the Logical Positivists. Indeed, both assumed that we communicate thoughts to other people only through language; so that we can correctly analyse thoughts through analysing language alone. As Stebbing put it, for them 'To communicate is to use language. Hence, ... for Logical Positivists, the problem of knowledge resolves itself into the problem how language can be used to communicate.' (1933, pp. 67–8). These were all ideas of Frege's (Milkov 2020b).

It is true, though, that the philosophers of the Vienna Circle, but Carnap, scarcely referred to Frege. In fact, however, this point only betrays that Frege's influence on them came through some indirect channel. Above all, it was Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, so that following it, the Logical Positivists also adopted Frege's leading idea that the task of philosophy is to make

our thinking clear by exploring the true symbolism—the perfect language. Stebbing herself identified the 'new logic' with this idea (1933, pp. 65 f.).

That the leading ideas of the *Tractatus* were substantially influenced by Frege is a matter of fact. Here one is reminded of Wittgenstein's acknowledgement in the 'Preface' of the book that he was 'indebted to Frege's great works'. This relatedness was first explicitly demonstrated by Elisabeth Anscombe in (1959). Later, it was more deeply underlined by Michael Dummett, who maintained that when he followed Frege, 'Wittgenstein is at his happiest', but when he criticised Frege, 'he was almost at his worst' (1991, pp. 237, 239).

The influence of Frege and of the Germanophone philosophy of the late 19th century in general on the members of the Vienna Circle could be best demonstrated by the example of his impact exerted on Rudolf Carnap. On one hand, Carnap was directly influenced by Frege. This should not come as a surprise since he attended no fewer than three of Frege's lectures on logic and was, as he later remembered, greatly impressed with them. Moreover, the supervisor of Carnap's dissertation, the Baden Neo-Kantian Bruno Bauch, was influenced by Frege as well. It was also of importance that Carnap attended the lectures of another Baden Neo-Kantian, Heinrich Rickert. In short, the connection between Frege and the Baden Neo-Kantians, Bruno Bauch and Heinrich Rickert, was that both followed some ground-breaking ideas of Hermann Lotze's (Milkov 2023, Chapter 9).

Furthermore, Morris Schlick's first philosophical work was on Heinrich Rickert as well. Among other things, he adopted from Rickert the view that human knowledge proceeds in judgments and is fixed in concepts. This exactly makes knowledge different from acquaintance. In other words, knowledge is not an act of mirroring the world but of validating its facts. Importantly, adopting this idea allowed Schlick to easily assimilate the ideas of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* when he moved to Vienna in 1922 (Milkov 2023, Chapter 9). To be sure, the Tractarian 'pictures' are not mirror-images of facts (of states of affairs) as well;[4] rather, they are their models, or, to be more exact, their '*tableaux vivant*' (4.0311).

This episode of history of philosophy shows two different ways of adopting the ideas of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*: in Cambridge, England, and in the germanophone Vienna. In Vienna, his ideas were easily assimilated, but not in Cambridge, though. In a letter to Wittgenstein on March 20, 1924, Keynes wrote that his *Tractatus* 'dominates all fundamental

discussions at Cambridge since it was written' (McGuinness 2008, p. 151). Be this as it may, nobody was really ready to follow its lead. Already in 1924, Ramsey noted that 'Wittgenstein is not good for [his] work' (Sahlin 1997, p. 64); and a few years later, he accused Wittgenstein of scholasticism (Ramsey 1929, p. 64). And despite the fact that Russell adopted some ideas from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* in the second edition of *Principia mathematica* (1925), after his turn to neural monism in 1919, Russell started to work in another direction.

As we are going to see below, all this explains why Stebbing's sharp critique of Wittgenstein in 1933 was seriously disquieting for him. The situation changed for the better only when John Wisdom was named Lecturer in Philosophy at Cambridge and a Fellow of Trinity College in 1934 and started to visit Wittgenstein's lectures (Wisdom 1936). At the same time a cohort of devoted students of Wittgenstein emerged, who praised his philosophy beyond limits.

4. Stebbing Against Logical Constructivism

Against Wittgenstein's logical analysis of language, Stebbing argued for, what she has called, the *directional analysis* of G. E. Moore. Stebbing first specified that it is a kind of *intellectual analysis*: '[It] consists in discerning relations and characteristics which are in no way altered by the process of analysing.' (1932–3, p. 77) In contrast, the task of the *material analysis*—the chemical, the physical analysis, or the psychoanalysis,—is the resolving of the analysandum to its ingredients.

There are three types of intellectual analysis: metaphysical, grammatical, and symbolic,[5] or formal-logical. Grammatical analysis is carried out by linguists; it aims at revealing the syntactical form. Symbolic analysis is the analysis practiced by formal logicians. It starts from postulates, is hypothetical and deductive. While the grammatical and symbolic (formal-logical) analyses remain at one and the same level, '[t]he aim of metaphysical analysis is to determine the elements and the mode of combination of those elements to which reference is made when any given true assertion is made' (p. 79). The elements of the resultant are to be found on a more basic level. Metaphysical analysis is directional analysis in this sense. It progresses from facts of less basic to facts of more basic level.

The aim of directional analysis is to reveal, in the resultant, more clearly the multiplicity of the analysed fact. In reality, the analysed fact and the resultant, including the final resultant,

have the same multiplicity as the initial fact. The resultant, however, shows the multiplicity in a more conspicuous way (1933, p. 81). It elucidates the structure of the facts. That is also why it is called metaphysical.

To be more specific, following Moore's philosophy of common sense, Stebbing was concerned with the analysis of our knowledge of some complex material things which we know, with certainty, to exist, such as this table, the books on it, the chairs in the seminar room, etc. to perceptual situations, perspectives, etc. At that, she adopted the materialist position that 'the external world is the world of macroscopic objects, in their spatial and temporal relations' (1933–4, p. 10). We don't need to construct the external world. It is true that we do not know the whole table directly. Nevertheless, the table is given to us, though indirectly. Directly given are only the sense-data. We must simply abandon the view that all that is given to us is given directly (1933, p. 78). The fact that the macroscopic objects are given to us indirectly sets up the task to make the structure—the multiplicity—of the facts clearer by revealing those aspects of them that are not given directly to us.

Stebbing was convinced that the philosophical problem is not that we must construct the world from simple elements, from sense-data, for example. She specifically criticised Russell's obsession with finding the individuals upon which to erect our knowledge of the external world (1933–4, p. 20). Still worse, Wittgenstein and the Logical Positivists transformed it into the linguistic principle that every sentence we understand can be translated into a sentence, every element of which could be used demonstratively.[6] Both approaches—that of Russell and that of Wittgenstein and of the Logical Positivists—lead to solipsism which, according to Stebbing, is a philosophical dead-end. She put her argument in Moorean way: 'I have the best grounds for denying solipsism, namely, I know it to be false.' (1933, p. 77)

Stebbing agreed that the objects of the external world can be called 'logical constructions' in the sense that macroscopic objects—tables, chairs, etc.—can be seen as made (composed) of low-level elements through logically definable connections. True to the idea of directional analysis, however, she was reluctant to use this expression—she did not believe that something was really being 'constructed' here. Her argument was that ' "tables are logical constructions" is a sensible remark and is also true. ... But "Logical constructions exist" is a nonsensical statement.' (1933–4, p. 19) Stebbing concluded that 'It would have been better to

avoid the use of the word "construction" altogether' (Ibid., p. 20). The external world is not constructed, neither are the macroscopic material objects. We have constructions in physical theories, not in the world.

The logical constructivists maintained that a system is always constructed relative to a certain base. But they also claimed that 'whatever base be chosen, other bases would be possible. ... [Hence,] no constructed system could be exhaustive with reference to the external world.' (Ibid., p. 25) In other words, construction is similar to a hypothesis; and there are alternative systems of constructions, based on the same facts. In Stebbing's interpretation, this is exactly what was assumed by Wittgenstein and the Logical Positivists. For Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, the facts are '*hypothetical* facts concerning my own experience, present or future; those hypothetical facts *verify* the proposition' (1933, p. 85). To Stebbing, Wittgenstein's logical constructivism is even weaker than that of Russell. To be sure, ultimately, Russell was a realist: 'In Russell's view, a fact is what makes a proposition true or false' (ibid.). This is also what Stebbing accepts. Wittgenstein, in opposition, was a staunch philosopher of language.

In reality, however, Wittgenstein was not a logical constructivist. The programme for logical constructivism was set up by Russell and Carnap and was not adopted by Wittgenstein or by Frege, before him (Milkov 2020a, pp.193 ff.). At one point, Stebbing was right, though. Wittgenstein was not a realist. He was a philosopher of language. Next, the term 'elucidation' that Moore and Stebbing readily used also played a central role in the *Tractatus*; not in the sense in which Stebbing meant it, though. To be sure, Wittgenstein's objective was not to elucidate facts. The task of his *Tractatus* (1922) was to elucidate the work of human language and thinking with the help of an ideal language, or conceptual script, constructed by him, a language which in the last resort disappears. Its function is solely educatory; it has no existential import (Milkov 2017, 2022).

5. The Role of Stebbing's Criticism in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Development

Stebbing's paper 'Logical Positivism and Analysis' was bitterly critical of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus.* It assumed that after his return to Cambridge in January 1929 and until March 1933, Wittgenstein continued its main line of thought. In this connection, it is to be noted that at this point in time, Wittgenstein was facing considerable resistance in Cambridge. Charles Broad did not accept his philosophy, and, as seen in § 3, neither did Frank Ramsey.

Eventually, it was publicly criticised in a paper on Cambridge philosophy of the time by Richard Braithwaite (1933), a close friend and follower of Ramsey. As a matter of fact, Stebbing's paper 'Logical Positivism and Analysis' made considerable use of Braithwaite's essay, which she read when it was still unpublished (Stebbing 1933, p. 63, n. 4). Her paper, however, was much more disapproving than that of Braithwaite. In truth, it was nothing but a list of Wittgenstein's 'muddles'.

We already know, however (from § 1, above), that in 1933 Stebbing was the leading figure of the new, analytic philosophy in UK. So, it is not difficult to imagine how disquieting her criticism was for Wittgenstein. To be sure, there is no evidence that Wittgenstein read Stebbing's paper. However, it is most reasonable to assume that part of its contents leaked out to him through his students and friends. Wittgenstein's immediate reaction was his notorious letter to the editor of *Mind* (i.e., to G. E. Moore), written on May 27, 1933, in which he 'disclaim[ed] all responsibility for the views and thoughts which Mr. Braithwaite [and so also Stebbing] attributes to [him]' (1933).

In fact, Wittgenstein's negative attitude to Stebbing was long-lasting and this is well documented. For example, he

> had opposed a proposal by some members of the philosophy Faculty [in Cambridge] that she be invited to give a paper in the spring of 1939, and had subsequently insisted that if such a meeting were to take place it should be a 'starred' one, meaning that only junior members were permitted to attend and in effect excusing Wittgenstein himself from being there. (Chapman 2013, p. 148)

In Wittgenstein's defence, it should be noted that after 1933 Stebbing interest in academic philosophy faded. Instead, she directed her attention to a program of developing clear thinking that can be also helpful in issues of practical importance (Milkov 2024).

Be this as it may, after March 1933, i.e., immediately after Braithwaite and Stebbing's criticism, Wittgenstein made a turn in his philosophy almost as dramatic as his turn of 1929—a turn which, arguably, invalidated their criticism. It found its first expression in his Cambridge lectures, delivered in 1932–3. After the 26th lecture (1979, p. 31), Wittgenstein stopped speaking of 'verification', 'visual field', 'private language' altogether. (Here it should be remembered that the main argument of Braithwaite and Stebbing against Wittgenstein was

'his solipsism'—his 'insisting that the verification of a proposition which I assert must be in my own experience' (Braithwaite 1933, p. 27).) Instead, Wittgenstein started to claim that the meaning of the word is nothing but its use. In addition, immediately after March 1933, he made the criticism of the private language argument a central theme in his lectures. Wittgenstein also ended his conversations with Waismann that are recorded in *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*—the last protocol is dated from July 1932 (1984, p. 209). Wittgenstein's objective was clear: he wanted to clearly distance himself from the Vienna logical positivists, in particular, from Carnap.

These theoretical changes in Wittgenstein's philosophy led to changes in his writing projects as well. In the summer of 1933, he started revisions of TS 213, on which parts of *Philosophical Grammar* and the *Blue Book* were based. These writings were Wittgenstein's first serious attempts to compose his 'new book'. So, it is fair to say that Susan Stebbing was the midwife of Wittgenstein's new philosophical rebirth.

Moreover, following the publication of Stebbing's paper, the opposing of two types of analytic philosophy, that of Moore and that of Wittgenstein, became widely accepted. On May 31, 1935, John Wisdom read a paper at the Moral Science Club in Cambridge on 'Moore and Wittgenstein' in which he summed up the difference between the two as follows: 'Moore recommends "What is the meaning of the word so and so?" ... In contrast, Wittgenstein recommends: "What is the grammar of the word so-and-so?" '. (Nedo 2012, p. 315) Importantly enough, Wittgenstein attended this lecture and it may be well the case that it motivated him to further distance himself from Moore's type of analysis (see the last paragraph of § 6, below).

6. The Later Moore Versus Russell and his Piece with the Later Wittgenstein

Besides differences between Moore, on one hand, and Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, on the other, Stebbing also recorded considerable differences between Moore and Russell (Ewing 1934). As we already know, whereas Russell spoke about logical constructions, Moore refused to do this. The differences between Moore and Russell became especially conspicuous after 1925. As Stebbing put it, according to Moore of this period, 'that the belief follows is ... not to be taken to mean that it follows "according to the rules of inference accepted by Formal Logic" ' (1942, p. 525). There are quite different types of *following* that are not to be confused with one another. (In contrast, Russell assumed that the following was of one type

only—that of formal logic. This conception also underpinned his search for epistemological certainty from which he hoped to be in a position to apodictically infer any other knowledge.[7]) In fact, this position of Moore led Wittgenstein to assume in *Philosophical Investigations* 'the diversity of the tools of language and of the ways they are used' (1953, § 23). Of course, Moore didn't put this insight in terms of the philosophy of language.

By way of elucidating the difference between Moore and Russell, we should also say some words about Frege's direct and indirect influence on the latter. To be sure, it was Frege who stirred Russell, and also the early Wittgenstein, to adopt the view that ordinary language, on one hand, and logic, on the other, has quite different forms; so that the task of both logic and philosophy is to look for the true logical form that lies hidden beneath the grammatical form. In contrast, the early Moore—from 1896 till 1905—followed the method of examining philosophers' sentences, which aimed at explicating the propositions they in fact intended to state in ordinary language. As Moore had noted in his 'Autobiography', only Russell's *The Principles of Mathematics* and his Theory of Descriptions persuaded him to reformulate his method of examining 'what on earth this-and-this philosopher means by *p*?' in terms of philosophy of language. This turn found an ultimate expression in Moore's lectures *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (1910–11), in which he divided the 'contents of the Universe' into two classes—propositions and non-propositions (1953, p. 56) (Milkov 2003, pp. 29 ff.).

Gradually, however, Moore felt more and more uncertain in respect of the logic of the Russell–Frege type. Eventually, he returned to his sturdy philosophical realism and tried to reformulate and refine it. A real break-through in this direction was presented in his inaugural lecture as Professor of Philosophy in Cambridge, 'A Defence of Common Sense' (1925), which many considered to be the starting point of analytical philosophy (Duncan-Jones 1937). This development gathered momentum in Moore's first course of lectures as a Professor at Cambridge in 1925–6, later published in *Lectures on Philosophy* (1966). It reached its pinnacle in Moore's open criticism of Russell in the early 1940s (Moore 1940–4, 1944).

The key point of Moore's opposing Russell's logic was the treatment of 'incomplete symbols'. The term was introduced in Russell/Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* in the sense of a symbol that is not used in isolation, but in a context (Russell and Whitehead 1910, pp. 66). The prime example of an incomplete symbol is the 'definite description'—it is a logical fiction. However, in the just cited *Lectures on Philosophy*, Moore insisted, in

opposition to Russell, that 'incomplete symbols' are not fictitious. Russell's failure to grasp their true character could be easily seen if we consider that it is not possible to perceive a fictitious entity; while we clearly perceive what is supposed to be an entity denoted by definite descriptions—this table, for example.

The most important implication of the discrimination made by Moore–Stebbing between incomplete symbols and logical fictions was that these two types of concepts give rise to two different types of logical consequences: imply, and entail. Imply is a strict logical consequence, whereas entail is a metaphysical one and is not exclusive. Here is one example of this distinction. The proposition 'unicorns are fictitious', where 'unicorns' is an incomplete symbol, 'metaphysically implies' that there are no unicorns in the real world. In contrast, 'lions are logical fictions' logically entails that 'there are no lions' in a sense in which this is a *proposition* about words (Moore 1966, p. 122). The first proposition presupposes a directional analysis, the second one a logical analysis.

Importantly enough, after Wittgenstein came to Cambridge in 1929, he adopted (perhaps following Ramsey's wink (Misak 2019)) a similar conception. Whereas in the *Tractatus* he maintained that the elementary propositions are logically autonomous, now he realised that we can infer from one elementary proposition another: 'From "*a* is now red" there follows "*a* is now not green" and so elementary propositions in this sense aren't independent of each other like the elementary propositions in the calculus I once described.' (1974, p. 211) It followed that the rules of formal logic are not the only rules of language.

Among other things, this relatedness explains why, despite the clear difference between Moore and Wittgenstein Stebbing referred to, the two philosophers worked together for years. To be sure, while in her 1933 paper Stebbing opposed Wittgenstein's 'bad' to Moore's 'good' philosophy, between 1930 and 1933 Moore regularly attended Wittgenstein's lectures and also openly stayed close to him. Be this as it may, the divergence between them was still considerable. Fundamentally, it was due to the fact that Wittgenstein remained a devoted philosopher of language, whereas Moore was mainly a philosopher of facts. Perhaps the most spectacular case of disparity between the two philosophers came to light in their discussion on May 2, 1939, in the Moral Science Club in Cambridge, when Wittgenstein 'rudely' criticised Moore's position on certainty. Against Moore, Wittgenstein argued that 'the concepts of knowledge and certainty have no application to one's own sensations' (Wittgenstein, Moore,

and Malcolm 2015, p. 77). They are only valid in a definite system of sentences, in language games that are underpinned by specific forms of life (see the Chapter on 'Wisdom's Wittgenstein' in this volume). Eventually, Wittgenstein's arguments on this count were published in his book *On Certainty* (1969).

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Notes

[1] Five years later this difference found its clearest expression in a paper of Max Black's which reads: 'It is ... the different direction given to the practice of philosophical analysis *in England* by Moore's example, to which the current difference between *English analysts* and logical positivists can be traced.' (Black 1939–40, p. 26; emphasis added)

[2] This claim is only partly true. As we are going to see in § 6, under the influence of Russell's *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903), around 1910 Moore experienced a short-lived 'linguistic turn'. It is well documented in his 1911–11 lectures *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (1953).

[3] We should add, this was also Frege's approach that Wittgenstein simply adopted from him.

[4] According to the *Tractatus*, *logic*, not science, is 'a mirror-image of the world' (6.13).

[5] Whereas initially Stebbing discussed the 'symbolic analysis' (1932–3, passim), in March 1933 she spoke of 'postulational analysis' (1933, pp. 80 f.).

[6] This, of course, was not the real position of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.

[7] Russell changed his position in (1948).