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The Normative Burdens of Trust

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Trust is an indispensable condition of successful social functioning. It is a means of extending the efficacy of our agency and empowering the agency of others.[1] It serves to foster and deepen interpersonal relationships, allowing for the kind of secure attachments that are crucial to our development and well-being.[2] But trust is also risky. Typically, we trust when we need to count on others to help us navigate our own vulnerabilities and agential limitations. This means we must place those we trust in a position to let us down or even harm our interests. Given the riskiness of trusting and the difficulties of judging trustworthiness, it is easy to see why we are sometimes reluctant to rely on others in this special way. However, we are also sometimes reluctant for others to trust us, despite not being subject to the same vulnerabilities as trusters. If we are positioned to garner the benefits of trust without the risks that come with being a truster, what is it about the nature of trust that explains why we might reasonably resist it?

Trust theorists have recognized and attempted to address this puzzle, and their explanations have shed some light on what it is about trust that lends itself to being construed as burdensome, when it is. In trusting an agent to perform some action, we don't simply believe, desire, or hope that the person does as trusted, but we hold the person to certain *expectations*. Extant explanations of unwelcome trust highlight some important features of the central normative expectation internal to trust, but, as I will argue, if we seek a complete, robust account of trust's central normative expectation, the pictures that emerge do not yet provide one. They do, however, gesture toward a fruitful path for constructing such an account.

In what follows, I critically examine, and build on the insights of, extant explanations of unwelcome trust to motivate a novel account of the central normative expectation internal to trust. Specifically, I argue that the central

[1] See McGeer (2008) and Jones (2012; 2017).

[2] See Holton (1994), McCleod (2002), Wonderly (2016), Darwall (2017), and Kirton (2020).

normative expectation internal to trust is that the trusted adopt a particular orientation of care toward the truster. This orientation not only makes sense of why trust can seem burdensome even when it is not apparently difficult to fulfill but also provides us with a view of trust's normativity that bridges explanatory gaps left by extant treatments of unwelcome trust.

This chapter is divided into five sections. In Section I, I describe some key features of the attitude of trust at issue. In Section II, I survey three common approaches to explaining what it is about the nature of trust such that it is sometimes construed as burdensome or unwelcome, where each approach appeals to a particular feature of trust's central normative expectation. In Section III, I critically evaluate the insights and limitations of these explanations. In Section IV, I argue that trust's central normative expectation consists in an invitation for the trusted to adopt an orientation of care—that is, to invest special attention in the interests and well-being of the truster in a particular domain of interaction. Finally, in Section V, I discuss some advantages of my account and address a potential objection.

I. The Attitude of Trust (and the Feeling of Betrayal)

Let us begin by specifying the type of trust at issue in this chapter. There are, after all, many ways in which we might employ the term "trust." Some uses, for example, pick out mere reliance as in "trusting" my alarm clock to wake me in time for work. Others pick out mere belief—for example, "trusting that" it will be a good day or that what was said is true. The sense of trust I mean to capture is reducible neither to mere reliance nor to belief but marks a complex attitude that we take toward other agents—one characterized by normative, though not necessarily predictive, expectations. Also note that this attitude is related to, but differs from, what we might call a "mutual bond of trust," which implies reciprocation. Although we often see such bonds in relationships like friendships or romantic partnerships, there are many cases of the attitude of trust that occur outside of these thick interpersonal relationships. Moreover, even in the context of intimate relationships, there may still be some things that we do not want to become matters of trust.[3]

[3] See Hawley (2014).

While there are many different accounts of trust on offer, I will, for now, work with an ecumenical conception of trust that focuses on two key marks that theorists commonly attribute to the attitude. First, trust is generally taken to be a species of reliance distinct from *mere* reliance.[4] What distinguishes trust from reliance is highly disputed, ranging from the belief that the one trusted has a commitment to do the thing trusted, to a sense of optimism regarding the goodwill of the one trusted, to normative expectations regarding the trusted's responsiveness to the fact that the truster is counting on her.[5] On some views, then, when I trust another to φ, I rely on her to φ under a certain description or from a particular perspective. If she just happens to φ for reasons wholly unrelated to her commitment, her goodwill toward me, or my dependence on her, then it's not clear that her φ-ing would fulfill my trust. An account of trust's central normative expectation that adequately explains why one might reasonably reject it should capture this key mark.

A second important mark of trust is that it makes the involved parties susceptible to certain reactive attitudes, particularly betrayal. As trusters we are susceptible to feelings such as gratitude when our expectations are met, and disappointment or betrayal when they go unfulfilled. In being trusted, we are potential targets of those attitudes and poised to experience certain self-regarding attitudes, like pride and guilt, regarding our performance. While some reactive attitudes like (moral) resentment track violations of obligations, the relationship between betrayal and obligations is less clear.

The link between trust and betrayal is widely recognized in the literature and is particularly important for those who wish to explain unwelcome trust by appealing to the type of normative expectation internal to trust.[6] But despite its import, the concept of betrayal has received little sustained attention in the trust literature.[7] And here, I can provide only a brief (but hopefully helpful) sketch that we can use going forward.

[4] See, for example, Baier (1986), Faulkner (2017), and Goldberg (2020).

[5] For commitment-centered accounts, see McLeod (2002) and Hawley (2014). For accounts that focus on the goodwill of the person trusted, see Baier (1986) and Jones (1996). In later work, Jones (2012; 2017) offers a dependence-responsiveness account. It is generally accepted that trust involves a belief or at least optimism about the trusted's competence to fulfill the truster's expectations, so the element that distinguishes trust from ordinary reliance tends to pertain to reasons for relying on the individual in the special way characteristic of trust. Note that not all theorists are concerned with this distinction (see Hardin (2002); Hawley (2014)).

[6] For more on the link between trust and betrayal, see Baier (1986); Holton (1994); Jones (2004); McGeer (2008); O'Neil (2012); Hawley (2014); Hinchman (2017); Kirton (2020).

[7] See Kirton (2020). For exceptions, see Shklar (1984); O'Neil (2012); and Margalit (2017).

First, the readiness to feel a sense of betrayal, as opposed to simply disappointment or resentment, is distinctively linked to the attitude of trust.[8] You may, for instance, resent an urgent care physician who negligently administers a medication to which you reported a serious allergy, yet feel both resentment and betrayal if your longtime family physician were to do the same. Both doctors ought to know better and have been remiss in their professional duties toward you. However, your inclination toward betrayal in the latter case suggests that you trust your family physician to fulfill her duties toward you but merely rely on the other.[9]

A second important feature is that betrayal does not simply track obligation or performance failures of the one trusted.[10] As in the physician case above, one may hold both parties accountable for failing to fulfill their obligations (their performance failures) but experience betrayal in response to only one. Moreover, we may feel betrayed when no obligation has been violated. For instance, I might trust a close friend to confide in me and feel betrayed when I learn they have undergone a major personal event and opted not to share it with me, while acknowledging they had no obligation to do so.

Finally, a third key feature of betrayal is that it is highly personal. The feeling of betrayal is marked by feelings of personal hurt or rejection, rather than simply resentment or disappointment.[11] This rejection often prompts us to reevaluate our relationship with the betrayer,[12] but it can also be felt deeply absent a thick interpersonal relationship.[13] Though there is scant

[8] See O'Neil (2012). Carolyn McLeod explains that "Feeling betrayed is the expected emotional response to broken trust, but it is not a feeling we would have toward someone on whom we merely relied" (2000: 474). See Kirton (2020) for use of the notion of betrayability in distinguishing trust from other phenomena.

[9] Theorists often describe betrayal in this context as a reactive attitude—specifically, a fitting response to violations of trust (Baier 1986; Jones 1996; Helm 2014; Darwall 2017). Notice that this attitude or feeling of betrayal is distinct from the act of betrayal. One can be betrayed without necessarily feeling the sting of betrayal. For instance, one might be betrayed by a cheating spouse yet feel relief rather than betrayal, seeing the act merely as a fortuitous excuse to dissolve an unhappy marriage. Moreover, one can feel a sense of betrayal without having been betrayed, as might be the case when one unreasonably trusts another to do something beyond their abilities and they (predictably) fail. We might helpfully characterize the act of betraying trust as disregard for the central normative expectation internal to trust, while the feeling of betrayal is a reaction to that (perceived) disregard. For an alternative view, see O'Neil (2012).

[10] Although I argue that betrayal does not track obligation, it can be appropriate in cases where obligations are flouted. Cheating on one's spouse when one is trusted to uphold their marital vows involves a violation of trust that also trades on an obligation to be faithful. For accounts that link betrayal and obligation, see Pettit (1995); McGeer (2008); O'Neil (2012); and Hinchman (2017).

[11] See Shklar (1984).

[12] See O'Neil (2012: 308) and Margalit (2017).

[13] See Kirton (2020: 592).

discussion of the exact nature of this rejection, I suggest that we can understand it in terms of a disregard for the central normative expectation internal to trust. So, to understand what is being rejected and how the truster's expectations are unmet in the relevant way, we need a more complete characterization of the central normative expectation that the trusted fails to fulfill. In the following section I explore some proposed explanations of unwelcome trust and the roles they play in illuminating the nature of trust's central normative expectation.

II. Extant Explanations of Unwelcome Trust

We can distinguish explanations of unwelcome trust in the literature roughly by the aspect of the normative expectation internal to trust that each explanation highlights. The first sort of explanation appeals to trust's normative pressure. The idea, as Karen Jones puts it, is that we may find trust unwelcome because "for one reason or another, we do not want to have to take such expectations into account, across the range of interactions the truster wants."[14] It may be that what we are trusted to do is difficult or requires a great deal of effort. Or it might be that we simply do not want to be subject to normative pressure, finding the yoke of expectation burdensome.[15] Consider the following case:

> Every day at the same time, Manny goes for a walk on the same route around his neighborhood. He does this with such regularity that his neighbors have even joked that "you can set your watch by him!" Indeed, his neighbors have come to rely on his regularity and some, on occasion, even use Manny's appearance on his route to determine the time. One day, Manny's neighbor Martha tells him that she has an important meeting the following afternoon and that she will use his walk to gauge when she should stop working in the garden and prepare for the meeting. She tells Manny that she trusts him to take his walk as usual, which Manny finds unwelcome.[16]

[14] Jones (1996: 9). Jones emphasizes the nature of trust as reason-giving, suggesting that, in a world where trust did not exist but the reasons for which others act were transparent and known to us, we still "could not have the confidence that, sometimes, another would meet [us] in [our] dependency in a domain when norm-governed and other reasons had run out for them" (2017: 100).

[15] See Darwall (2017).

[16] This case is a liberal interpretation of a characterization of Kant and his constitutionals originally described by Baier (1986) and often used in subsequent trust literature.

Although taking a walk is not difficult for Manny, he may nonetheless find Martha's trusting him to do so unwelcome because he does not wish to be subject to her expectation. This explanation implies that the attitude of trust exerts some normative pressure that one might reasonably wish to avoid. Jones has argued that trust centrally involves the expectation that the one trusted be directly and favorably moved by the dependence of the truster.[17] In other words, the fact that Martha is counting on Manny in this special way gives him a reason to do as trusted. Unfortunately, Jones says little more about how one's counting on another exerts such pressure.

Some philosophers argue that the normative pressure exerted by trust stems from the obligation it tends to confer on the trusted.[18] Others argue that trust presupposes neither the standing to make demands nor the authority to hold the trusted accountable to the truster's expectations, and, as such, its normative pressure is better understood in terms of an invitation rather than an obligation.[19] Despite disagreement about the normative structure of trust, it is widely agreed that trust opens the involved parties to certain negative reactive attitudes, suggesting another explanation for why we might find trust unwelcome.

One defining feature of the central normative expectation internal to trust is the kind of reactive attitude it leaves one open to when trust is disappointed. What I will call reactive explanations of unwelcome trust suggest that trust lays us open to certain negative reactive attitudes, and we may wish to avoid causing or being the target of these attitudes.[20] As Katherine Hawley (2014) explains, trust transforms our predictive expectations into normative ones, setting up those we trust as targets of resentment, hurt feelings, or betrayal if they fail to fulfill our expectations. Moreover, the trusted may wish to avoid being the cause of such attitudes and feelings in the truster. Thus, one might often prefer not to be trusted or, more selectively, wish to avoid certain things becoming matters of trust.

[17] See Jones (1996; 2012). While Jones does not explicitly characterize the expectation as normative, this seems to be a plausible interpretation of her view (see Darwall 2017: 36–8).

[18] See Hawley (2014) and O'Neil (2017). Although it is accepted that certain kinds of trust can be obligating, it is not clear that the attitude of trust itself can be. For instance, Collin O'Neil (2017) acknowledges the infelicity of taking the attitude of trust as one capable of unilaterally conferring an obligation on the trusted. We can certainly trust others to do things they are already obligated to do. And we can accept another's trust in a way that rises to the level of an agreement or promise, thereby conferring an obligation to do the thing promised. But this is not what seems to be happening in ordinary cases like Manny's where the attitude of trust is present but without what might be called a bond of trust.

[19] See Darwall (2017).

[20] See Baier (1986); Holton (1994); Jones (1996); and Darwall (2017).

The diagnosis of unwelcome trust in Manny's case, then, is that he does not wish to be positioned to betray or cause Martha to resent him if he fails to take his walk as she expects. If Martha has no authority to demand that Manny take his walk, and so he is under no obligation to do so, he may not be an apt target of Martha's resentment if he stays home, but may still yet be the cause of feelings of betrayal. So, even if he does not risk her resentment, he may still wish to avoid causing the special hurt of betrayal, and so prefer that she merely rely on rather than trust him.

Still another set of explanations of unwelcome trust centers on the content of the central normative expectation that would seem to license the reaction of betrayal. Betrayal is typically associated with close personal relationships, and some theorists posit that trust can be burdensome in virtue of the truster presuming or seeking to initiate a relationship that the trusted may want to resist. This is the central claim in what I call relational explanations. As Stephen Darwall explains, we trust "from the perspective of implied relationship with the person we trust . . ." which involves the truster either presupposing or seeking to initiate a personal relationship with the trusted (2017: 38). The relationship itself can be unwelcome, or it might require the trusted to act on relationship-specific commitments (McLeod 2002). Trust may also be unwelcome when the truster's expectation flouts the norms governing the relationship in some way (Helm 2014).

According to relational explanations, there are several reasons why Manny might find Martha's trust unwelcome. First, her trust may exceed what she can reasonably expect of Manny given the norms governing their relationship. Second, if her trust is only appropriate given the norms of a relationship that doesn't obtain between Manny and Martha, or Manny does not desire the sort of relationship presupposed, he may find her trust unwelcome. Finally, fulfilling Martha's trust may require Manny to act on commitments that are not characteristic of the sort of relationship Manny has (or wants) with Martha.

Each kind of explanation reveals something important about trust's central normative expectation. Explanations that appeal to the normative pressure exerted by trust show that, whatever its normative structure, the attitude of trust has some normative force for the trusted. Reactive explanations show that the truster's expectations leave the involved parties open to certain reactive attitudes, particularly betrayal, which is a unique response to the disappointment of those expectations. Finally, relational explanations suggest how interpersonal relationships between the truster and the trusted can affect the appropriateness of the truster's expectations. However, while

these explanations offer important insights about the central normative expectation internal to trust, they also highlight the need to address certain explanatory gaps and unanswered questions.

III. Limits of Extant Explanations

Above, I argued that extant explanations of unwelcome trust could help inform the nature of trust's central normative expectation. Employing insights gleaned from these explanations, I will now consider a case that highlights some important remaining questions about trust's central normative expectation.

Bothered Bartender

A man walks into a bar. Having just come from retrieving his father's cremated remains, he places an urn on the bar top beside him, orders a drink, and strikes up a friendly conversation with the bartender, Joe. Eventually, Joe goes to the back for supplies. Upon his return he finds the man gone, having left his urn and a note. The note explains that the man had to run an important errand that could take a few hours, and it was not practical to take the urn with him. He says he trusts Joe to look after it and thanks him for doing so. Although Joe's shift will last several more hours and he can easily store the urn behind the bar, he nonetheless finds the man's trust in him unwelcome.

One explanation for Joe's discomfort can be found in the normative pressure exerted by the kind of expectation internal to trust. Proponents of this explanation might argue that Joe finds the man's trust unwelcome because he does not want to be subject to his expectations. The problem is that it is unclear from this explanation what it is about trust that exerts the relevant pressure.

One might reply that the central normative expectation internal to trust has the form of a demand and confers an obligation on the trusted, and this is what Joe finds unwelcome. However, we often trust others to do things we have no standing to demand of them, and it is not clear what it is about the man's holding an attitude of trust toward Joe that could be obligating. Even if we represent Joe as having a professional obligation that the man trusts

him to fulfill, it is not the man's trust that exerts the relevant pressure but Joe's pre-existing obligation, and it is not clear why Joe would suddenly find that obligation unwelcome because the man now trusts him to fulfill it.[21]

Finally, one might argue that if Joe were to accept the man's trust, his acceptance would constitute an agreement or promise that confers an obligation, and this explains what Joe finds unwelcome.[22] This seems plausible, though it would not be the man's trust that binds but the agreement or promise. The mere attitude of trust will not suffice to ground an obligation. What Joe would find unwelcome, then, is not the man's trust *per se* but the obligation stemming from Joe's acceptance of his trust. But perhaps there is another aspect of trust's central normative expectation that explains why Joe finds the man's trust unwelcome, namely that it makes Joe a potential target of the man's negative reactive attitudes.

Whatever the normative structure of trust, Joe might be uncomfortable with the prospect of being the cause or target of the man's resentment or feelings of betrayal if Joe should fail to fulfill his trust. Although such reactive explanations highlight a potentially burdensome feature of trust, they have some difficulty accounting for the subset of reactive attitudes typically associated with trust. First, although it may sometimes be appropriate to resent the trusted for failing to fulfill our trust, moral resentment seeks accountability for flouting moral obligation and trust does not obviously obligate. As Stephen Darwall notes, failures of trust "do not, in themselves, justify resentment and blame, so much as other more personal responses like being 'let down' or some other form of personal hurt" (2017: 40). But it is not clear what it is about trust that warrants this sort of feeling. For instance, if the central normative expectation internal to trust is that the trusted is directly and favorably responsive to the dependence of the truster (Jones 1996), it is not clear why the appropriate reaction is hurt feelings rather than, say, frustration. So, explanations that appeal to our aversion to being the target (or cause) of negative reactive attitudes must still account for trust's link to a certain subset of attitudes, including betrayal.

Further, given the unique link between trust and betrayal, reactive explanations must speak to what it is about the nature of trust that explains why betrayal is sometimes an appropriate reaction to disappointed trust. As

[21] See O'Neil (2012) for more on trusting others to fulfill pre-existing obligations.

[22] One might also argue that in the context of intimate relationships, which are pervaded by a bond of trust, such agreements (and therefore obligations) abound. I will address this in more depth later, but even in such cases I suspect that the obligations are grounded by relationship norms rather than the attitude of trust.

Collin O'Neil notes, even when one takes the trusted to be under an obligation, it is the readiness to feel betrayal rather than resentment or mere disappointment, in response to failures by the trusted, that is distinctive of the attitude of trust (2012: 308). It might be appropriate, for instance, to resent a stranger (whom you do not trust) for stealing your laptop but not to feel betrayed, whereas it does seem appropriate to experience betrayal (as well as resentment) if the theft is committed by a friend. One explanation is that, in cases of betrayal, the trusted manifests a failure to engage the needs of the truster in the way expected (Hinchman 2017: 51). But this sort of explanation calls for a more specific articulation of trust's central normative expectation in order to account for the differences in expectations between the friend and the stranger. Favorable responsiveness to the dependency of the truster and acting in accordance with one's obligation seem too general to play this role. Relational explanations, however, offer a more promising path to the sort of articulation we seek.

Relational explanations appeal to relationship-specific norms to explain what is personal, and sometimes unwelcome, about trust. For instance, Darwall explains that what trust seeks is the kind of mutual recognition that is distinctive of personal relationships like friendship and love, which we have no authority to demand, but hope for and feel hurt or let down when unreciprocated (2017: 46). This explains trust's connection to personal reactive attitudes rather than accountability-seeking attitudes like resentment. It also helps explain what we might find unwelcome, namely the second-personal recognition and responsiveness characteristic of a kind of close relationship that might not obtain between the truster and trusted. This may be particularly problematic since part of what trust seeks is a kind of reciprocity (Darwall 2017). For Darwall, although trust does not issue a demand, it does come with an implicit RSVP, a call for the trusted to hold some fitting attitude in return (2017: 40–1). As Darwall explains,

> . . . it does seem essential to my trusting you that I invite you to accept my trust and, indeed, that I invite you to trust that I am indeed trusting you, to trust in my trust and in me, trusting you. It will turn out that trust is a reciprocating attitude to itself. (2017: 42)

Importantly for explaining unwelcome trust, the second-personal standing of the truster in this call-and-response structure can be felt as an 'imposition' by the trusted (Darwall 2017: 40). So, in Joe's case, the man's trust may be unwelcome, not because it is obligating, but because it calls on him to

respond to the offer of trust in a way that presupposes or seeks to initiate a relationship Joe may not desire. A central expectation of the man's trust is that Joe reciprocate with trust, something Joe may feel is unwarranted or would make him (qua truster) vulnerable to the man in undesirable ways.

But it is not at all clear that this is what we expect when we trust. After all, it makes sense to trust strangers without expecting that they trust us in return. Moreover, although trust can be integral to building or reshaping relationships, it does not obviously presuppose any particular sort of relationship that we may reasonably wish to resist.

One might reply here that the difficulty lies in the truster's expectation that the trusted act on a relationship-specific commitment (McLeod 2002: 31–3; Hawley 2014). Different kinds of relationships are partly distinguished by the sort of concern and commitments that comprise them. A call to have what Carolyn McLeod labels 'special concern' for another, beyond the specific concern we are committed to having toward everyone, can be unwelcome. If a stranger's trust calls on you to act on a commitment you only have in a close friendship, that call may be unwelcome, especially if it requires you to reinterpret the nature of your relationship to make sense of acting on the relevant commitment.[23] As McLeod explains, "…trust is unwelcome when the trusted one does not perceive her relationship with me as the kind that requires her to fulfill the responsibility I trust her to fulfill" (2000: 171, note 4). Similarly, Bennett Helm argues that trust is unwelcome when it fails to root the responsiveness sought by the truster in respect for the community's (relationship-governing) norms (2014: 208). That is, insofar as the truster's expectations exceed what it is reasonable to demand given her relationship with the trusted, the trusted may find them unwelcome.

Although the norms and expectations governing the relationship between the truster and the trusted can go some distance in explaining why we might sometimes find trust unwelcome, some unanswered questions remain. First, as noted earlier, the attitude of trust does not issue a demand, and we often trust others to do what we cannot demand of them, so it is not obvious why the attitude of trust violates any norms in Helm's sense. Second, although we sometimes trust others to fulfill their commitments, in many cases what we

[23] While acting on one's commitments is central to McLeod's view, according to which the motivation expected from the trusted is moral integrity, Hawley (2014) holds that one may act only in accord with, though not necessarily on, one's commitments and still fulfill the truster's expectations.

trust others to do is not tied to any specific commitment, let alone one that is distinctive of a particular relationship. I may have a commitment only to close friends that I help them move, but I can help an acquaintance move without signifying that I hold such a commitment to them or that they should reinterpret the nature of our relationship to include one.

Finally, one might argue that if the central normative expectation internal to trust is that one will act with moral integrity to fulfill their commitments, the violation of these commitments, especially in the context of thick interpersonal relationships, accounts for the personal character of betrayal as a response to broken trust (McLeod 2000). However, without an explanation of the personal (rather than merely moral) significance of fulfilling such commitments it is not clear why their violation would elicit personal feelings like betrayal rather than a moral evaluation of the trusted. This explanatory gap suggests that, even within the rich normative context of thick interpersonal relationships, we need more to fully account for trust's personal character.

Thus, if we wish to glean a more complete understanding of trust's central normative expectation from an explanation of unwelcome trust, the explanation must make sense of the normative pressure exerted by trust, the distinctively personal reactive attitudes associated with trust, and how relationship considerations can affect trust.

IV. Trust and Care

In this section I sketch dual proposals for (i) an explanation of unwelcome trust and (ii) an account of the central normative expectation internal to trust. Specifically, I suggest that trust invites the trusted to adopt a particular orientation of care toward the truster, which the trusted might reasonably find unwelcome. I elaborate on the relevant features of invitation and care in what follows.

While invitations lack the peremptory force of moral demands, they nevertheless exert pressure for discursive uptake on the invitee.[24] Specifically, they call on the invitee to recognize and respond to the invitation by accepting it or

[24] See Telech (2020). By "invitation" I mean to characterize the type of "call" internal to trust. I mean to suggest neither that the invitation must be explicitly expressed nor that the truster must intend her trust as an invitation. For instructive discussion of how attitudes can function as forms of moral communication in the relevant sense, see Macnamara (2015).

providing some reason for not doing so (Darwall 2017). For example, if you invite me to your party, you have not demanded that I attend and I do not feel as though I *must* go, but I will feel some pressure to attend or provide an excuse. Unlike Darwall, who construes trust as both an invitation to accept trust and an invitation to the trusted to reciprocate with trust, I argue, in line with Jones (2012; 2017), that what trust seeks largely consists in responsiveness to the dependency of the truster. However, parting from Jones, I argue that what the truster seeks is not mere responsiveness to dependency but care—specifically, for the trusted to make a particular domain of the truster's interests a special locus of her attention.[25]

Theorists tend to characterize caring in terms of a suite of psychological states and dispositions which includes patterns of emotion, judgment, and attention. On Helm's view, for example, genuine care requires "a consistent pattern of attending to the relevant object: in short, a kind of *vigilance* for what happens or might well happen to it" (2010: 57). Agnieszka Jaworska describes caring as "a structured compound of various less complex emotions, emotional predispositions, and also desires, unfolding reliably over time in response to relevant circumstances" that construes its object as a source of import (Jaworska 2007: 560). Building on Jaworska's insights, Jeffrey Seidman argues that caring consists of "a disposition to attend to an object and hence to considerations pertaining to it, and a disposition to respond to the real or apparent reasons those considerations provide" (2016: 2785). These descriptions will be helpful in elaborating the caring orientation I take to be internal to trust.

Like (some versions of) the thicker notion of care described above, the relevant orientation of care is non-instrumental (directed at the object for its own sake), shapes one's deliberative boundaries, and is constituted by dispositions to attend to the object of care, to be emotionally vulnerable to how it fares, and to see it as a source of reasons for action and emotion.

Although the caring orientation invited by trust is less demanding than some of the richer and more robust conceptions employed by some caring theorists, it is typically more demanding than the bare concept of goodwill

[25] That trust calls for some sort of "care" is a familiar notion in the literature. Baier (1986) introduced the idea that trust is reliance on the trusted's goodwill toward the truster, and Jones (1996) echoed this, though she later argued that the concept is vague and often stretched beyond useful meaning (2012). Perhaps most similar to the kind of care I have in mind is McLeod's "special concern" (2002). As will become clearer in what follows, the orientation I describe is more extensive than goodwill and not tethered to relationship-specific commitments, distinguishing it from both Baier's and McLeod's conceptions.

sometimes found in theories of trust.[26] The relevant caring orientation is more of a psychological investment, constituted by the suite of attitudes and dispositions described earlier, like emotional vulnerability to the truster's interests, which goodwill needn't involve. For instance, although being positively responsive to another's dependency is a way of showing goodwill (Jones 2012: 69), one may show goodwill in other ways without the normative pressure to act. Goodwill can manifest in my hope that a stranger's unattended bag will not be tampered with, though I do not feel pressure to pay it special attention as I would were I to take a caring orientation toward the stranger's interests.

Furthermore, the caring orientation called for by trust can license inferences and further expectations that the, often vague, notion of goodwill does not. Goodwill plays a different relationship-oriented role than care. On many accounts, we are regularly required to display goodwill toward our fellow moral agents, whereas trust seeks a response that not all others are normally expected to take toward us. Given its closeness to the kind of caring attitudes that form the glue of more intimate relationships, even this more penumbral caring orientation can create pathways for initiating and advancing relationships in ways goodwill cannot. This makes sense of why we afford trust an elevated status in our interactions with others. We often accept it, in all its risks, recognizing that part of what makes it a special orientation is that it does carry some normative burdens of the sort we might sometimes wish to do without.

To see these features of the caring orientation at work, consider a situation in which a stranger at a café trusts you to look after her laptop while she steps away to take a call. In trusting you, the stranger invites you to devote special attention to her interests, for her own sake. This entails the safekeeping of her laptop because doing so matters to *her*. The orientation of care called for by trust involves making the truster's interests a special locus of attention for the trusted, rather than it merely turning out that the truster's interests overlap or coincide with those of the trusted.[27] For example, if you watch the laptop only because you intend to steal it for yourself later, then you are not fulfilling the stranger's trust. Similarly, if the stranger thinks you will watch the laptop solely because you fear that a pattern of thefts will sully the reputation of your favorite café, she may rely on you, but not trust you, to do it. Furthermore, attending to her interests in

[26] See Baier (1986) and Jones (1996).
[27] See Hardin (1993; 2002) for an alternative view.

the relevant way shapes your deliberative boundaries, ruling out some options and making others more salient. Whereas you might normally be inclined to leave the café, having finished your work, departing before the stranger returns won't be a live option. Or, you might notice, and attempt to correct, the laptop's unstable positioning on the table so it doesn't fall. The orientation also involves motivations to act in ways (reasonably) required to fulfill the truster's expectation, and dispositions toward certain self-directed reactive attitudes regarding your performance. Bound up in this orientation is also a disposition to be emotionally vulnerable to how the truster's interests (in the security of the laptop), which you have made an object of import for you, fare. If, for example, your attention lapsed and the laptop was stolen, you should be inclined to feel a degree of sadness or regret at the significance of the loss *for her*, not as a loss to you, nor as mere disappointment or guilt at your failure to live up to her expectations.[28]

How does this caring orientation help us understand why trust is sometimes unwelcome? First, the invitational structure of trust generates normative pressure for discursive uptake by the addressee. The addresser asks for a fundamentally important and personal orientation, the denial of which often results in hurt feelings. This can make even polite rejections of the truster's expectation uncomfortable and position us to hurt another's feelings. Failing, or refusing even to try, to adopt an invited caring orientation may also seem like a personal slight toward the truster.

Second, understanding the central normative expectation as asking another to adopt a particular orientation of care one has no standing to demand also helps explain why the subset of reactive attitudes associated with trust is so personal. We recognize that often when we trust we expect the trusted to respond in a way that we are not owed but has deep import and personal meaning. The orientation we seek as trusters is rooted in many of the same inclinations and dispositions that characterize intimate relationships and has special significance when it is freely given, especially in the absence of a relationship that calls for it. While this significance helps explain the personal nature of the specific reactive attitudes associated with trust, particularly betrayal, it also helps explain how relationship norms affect the appropriateness of trust, even between non-intimates.

The orientation of care invited by trust is of a similar, albeit penumbral, form of the orientation characteristic of more intimate relationships. The

[28] This isn't to deny that self-regarding disappointment, or even guilt or shame, are also aspects of the relevant emotional vulnerability.

trusted, then, might reasonably worry that adopting this orientation could falsely convey to the truster that the pair have (or could come to have) a closer relationship than the trusted desires. In the bartender case, for example, Joe may have been happy to look after the urn as part of his role as a bartender but is reluctant to represent himself as having the sort of orientation toward the man that could be construed as grounding a relationship other than that of bartender and patron. But we may find trust unwelcome for an even more personal reason.

Given the thicker nature of the orientation I have described, we may not want to adopt it toward just anyone at any time. It is not simply a matter of wishing to avoid being subject to personal reactive attitudes; it is that we may wish only to be so oriented in certain cases. For instance, Joe may be reluctant to attach special import to the interests of a stranger with whom he has no special connection, though he would be willing to accept the man's reliance on him along with attributions of the kind of goodwill we can reasonably expect from others. This is not simply in virtue of the role the orientation plays in undergirding relationships but is partly due to what is involved psychologically in taking up such an orientation. Considering the personal nature of its central normative expectation, then, it is no surprise that we are sometimes reluctant to accept the trust of others—to make what matters to them matter to us.

V. Advantages and Objections

Before examining a potential objection to my view, it is worth reviewing some advantages of my proposed account of trust's central normative expectation. First, it explains the normative pressure exerted by the attitude of trust in terms of the content and structure of the central normative expectation internal to trust. Second, the orientation of care explains the link between trust and the personal reaction of betrayal that reactive accounts identify as a distinctive burden of trust. Recall that the hurt felt in betrayal seems to stem from the sense that one's interests do not matter sufficiently to the trusted. This is the heart of the sense of abandonment and rejection sometimes felt when another conveys a lack of care about what matters to you, even when they face no obligation or commitment to care. When such care is partly constitutive of a relationship there might be a normative expectation to hold such a commitment or even an obligation to do so. This helps explain why, while betrayal can be an apt response to

failures by non-intimates or strangers, it is a much more common reaction to failures of trust within thick relationships. Still, even in these relationships there may be certain things we wish not to become matters of trust, precisely because we don't want *those things* to signify the nature and degree of care we have toward another.[29]

The caring orientation also explains, whereas reactive accounts do not, why trust in particular might be unwelcome when nearby phenomena like hope or mere reliance, which also risk hurt feelings, are not. Identifying betrayal as a reactive attitude unique to trust is not sufficient to account for this difference without an accompanying characterization of the normative expectation internal to trust that links it to betrayal.

Finally, although the relational views I have examined hit close to the mark, their construals of the relevant expectation rely on elements that are either too thin, impersonal, or narrow to fit the phenomenology of trust. The caring orientation I have described captures the personal nature of trust and its characteristic reactive attitudes better than responsiveness-based and respect-based explanations and without imposing an overly demanding view of the expectations internal to trust—for example, acting on relationship-specific commitments or trusting the truster in return.

One might worry that the orientation I have described asks too much of those we trust, particularly when dealing with strangers. It either makes trust so demanding that it appears undesirable without an antecedent relationship whose health and maintenance call for it, or it makes trust between strangers too rare. One might think it makes little sense to accept the trust of a stranger who asks you for directions if their trusting you requires you to make their interests a special locus of attention and to make yourself emotionally vulnerable to how those interests fare. Moreover, the apparent demandingness of this orientation does not fit with our everyday experiences of trusting strangers. When we trust a stranger for directions, we do not take ourselves to hold the expectation that they adopt a caring orientation toward us—it seems that what really matters is their competence and the likelihood that they are telling the truth, or so the objection goes. There are two avenues of reply here.

First, in ordinary language, we are not always careful to distinguish trust from mere reliance. Given our promiscuity with the term, we might mistakenly use "trust" where "reliance" would do better. Many instances of one-time interactions with strangers may more aptly be described as reliance

[29] Hawley makes a similar point using an example of one romantic partner trusting another to do a specific household chore (2014).

rather than trust, such as when we casually speak of trusting a concierge to recommend a great seafood restaurant nearby. If the recommendation is a bust, we do not tend to feel betrayed, but instead feel frustrated or irritated that they didn't do their job well. Similarly, when we speak of trusting drivers to obey the rules of the road, the situation seems better construed as one in which we rely on others to respect traffic laws and the moral demand not to recklessly endanger others. Again, we are more apt to feel resentment than betrayal when a driver cuts us off.

Sometimes, though, we do trust strangers in the relevant sense—inviting them to adopt a caring orientation toward us. Consider a case: you leave your optometrist's office after having your pupils dilated, and with your vision still blurry you need to cross a busy intersection. One of the strangers at the crosswalk notices your dark glasses and sympathizes with your situation, having been in a similar one herself. Her sympathetic interest in your situation might be enough to signal to you that you could rely on her in a special way to get you across the street. It might be reasonable to expect, for example, that she take extra care to point out obstacles in the crosswalk or not rush across and leave you behind, despite not actually having agreed to assist you. Although signaling trustworthiness is a complicated matter,[30] the point is that if you do take her engagement with you as a signal of trustworthiness, it is because it signifies that she has or is willing to adopt the kind of orientation sought by trust. For instance, if after your banter you began to follow her and she rushed ahead, leaving you to fend for yourself, you might feel betrayed, though you wouldn't if the other strangers had done the same—you have *trusted* her.

The second reply is that while the caring orientation involved in the optometry case certainly was special, not one that can simply be expected from just anyone, it is not obviously too demanding to be appropriate given the relationship between the truster and trusted. Familiarly, caring comes in degrees and forms, some of which are richer and deeper than others. While caring of this sort can lay the groundwork for developing relationships, it needn't constitute or initiate a lasting relationship.[31] We are capable of adopting (and commonly do) an orientation of care toward others with whom we have little or no antecedent relationship, making their interests in

[30] See Jones (2012; 2017).

[31] For example, we may exhibit a caring orientation when engaged in joint activities, like taking a walk together, and feel normative pressure to help the other see the activity through, without the orientation or sense of commitment persisting beyond that venture (see Gilbert 1990: 6).

a particular domain a special locus of attention for us for a time, without committing ourselves to that orientation or a more substantive relationship.

Conclusion

One benefit of the account I have offered is its ability to tie together the apparently disparate insights from extant explanations of unwelcome trust to form a clearer picture of the content and shape of the central normative expectation internal to trust. If the normative burdens of trust indeed stem from the caring orientation I claim that trust seeks, it helps us understand (i) what it is about trust, as opposed to hope or mere reliance, that exerts normative pressure that is sometimes unwelcome, (ii) how it is that distinctly personal reactive attitudes like betrayal are appropriate reactions to violations of trust, and (iii) that a central feature of relationships, namely the orientation of care, is embedded in trust's expectations such that trust can advance and even initiate relationships in ways that might be unwelcome under certain conditions.

I have argued that an examination of why trust is sometimes construed as unwelcome reveals that the core of trust's expectation is an invitation for another to take a caring orientation toward the truster, to make her interests in a particular domain a special locus of attention. In trusting, we ask others to make what matters to us matter to them, for our sake. This orientation makes sense of claims that trust can sometimes be felt as burdensome, in a way that explains the uniquely personal nature of the reactive attitudes characteristic of trust, and illuminates the dynamic interplay between trust and interpersonal relationships.[32]

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