Obligation, Accountability, and Anthropocentrism in Second-Personal Ethics

The Métis Nation has a long and ongoing relationship with the nonhuman creatures with whom it shares territory. Naturally, any culture that lives so closely with the other beings in its territory develops ideas about the proper relations between humans and other beings. For the Métis, a guiding principle of the relations between humans and other beings is *wahkootowin*, or kinship.[i] *Wahkootowin* underlies Métis politics, governance, social life, and ethical thought.[ii] *Wahkootowin* ethics, as I interpret the view, is committed to two important features of ethical obligation.

First, obligation is *direct*. My *wahkootowin* obligations, when I have them, are always between me and some other being, with no intermediary. It is the kinship relationship directly between my spouse and I that binds me to honour our vows. When I have obligations to my siblings or parents, it is also that kinship relations between the two of us that generates the obligations and has normative power over me. *Wahkootowin* obligations are also *directed*: they are always obligations *to* someone else. It makes no sense to say that I stand in a kinship relationship to no one in particular. Because those relationships are the basis of the *wahkootowin* ethical system, it likewise makes no sense to say that I have an obligation to no one in particular. Neither of these points are stated directly by the Métis thinkers who have written on *wahkootowin*, but I take them to be obvious features of kinship relations generally, and so take them as features of obligations generated by *wahkootowin* relationships as well.

There is an already established picture of ethics which can give an ethical worldview where obligations are direct and directed. Second-personal ethics is a style of ethical thought that

takes our obligations *to each other* as central to moral life. In the second-personal ethics literature, one prominent analysis of obligation comes from Stephen Darwall: roughly, I am obligated to act in a certain way toward you just in case you have the proper standing to hold me accountable for so acting.[iii] In this paper, I argue that this analysis of obligation cannot properly account for us being obligated *to* nonhuman beings and ecosystems. One potential solution to the problem I raise comes from Scanlon's Trustee Model.[iv] On that view, the reasonable rejection of our principles for action by a human trustee standing in for nonrational beings stands in for such an act by the beings themselves. While this view has some apparent positives, I argue that it retains a problematic anthropocentrism. On the trustee view, I argue, our obligation is not directed to the proper object, and so depends in an undesirable way on rational agents, viz. human beings.

I use the Métis notion of w*ahkootowin* as the basis of an account of obligation. While a literal translation of *wahkootowin* is something like 'relative' or 'relation', I use the English word "kinship" as a translation of *wahkootowin*, since I think it captures some of the normative connotation that comes along with the term in Michif and Cree.[v] Métis scholar Brenda Macdougall says that *wahkootowin* is a Cree concept which "represents how family, place, and economic realities were historically interconnected, the expression of a world view that laid out a system of social obligation and mutual responsibility between related individuals".[vi] I argue that *wahkootowin* offers a ground for obligation that can provide the attractive features of a second-personal account while including all the beings that ought to be included in our ethical reflection.

From a *wahkootowin* perspective, the domain of related individuals is much broader than just human beings. Métis elder Maria Campbell writes of *wahkootowin:* "at one time, from our place it meant the whole of creation. And our teachings taught us that all of creation is related

and interconnected to all things within it. *Wahkotowin* means honoring and respecting those relationships".[vii] Métis scholar Zoe Todd even extends kinship to oil, as a part of the landscape of the Métis homeland.[viii] The idea that we might have ethical obligations to oil demonstrates the radical departure that *wahkootowin* makes from other ethical views. Oil is not normally among the beings considered in moral deliberation. Thus, the notion of kinship that *wahkootowin* seeks to capture is much broader than the English word would imply.

In her book *One of the Family: Métis Culture in Nineteenth-Century Northwestern Saskatchewan,* Brenda Macdougall explains four major values of *wahkootowin*: reciprocity, mutual support, decency, and order.[ix] While Macdougall does not give us an explicitly ethical interpretation of *wahkootowin* (the pieces are there, but her concern is about social structures and not ethics in particular), I want to use *wahkootowin* and the principles we get from Macdougall as the foundation of a distinctly Métis ethical system. This is not to say, of course, that I intend to speak for all Métis communities in articulating my interpretation of a *wahkootowin* ethics, nor that all Métis communities would look to *wahkootowin* as the central concept or value on which to build their ethical worldview. I seek instead to articulate one Métis person's interpretation of the principles of *wahkootowin* as a central concept in ethical life, and to explain why it offers a preferable picture to the second-personal ethics that we get from Darwall.

I argue that each *wahkootowin* principle has a place in a *wahkootowin* ethical system. Mutual support can fill out the positive content of *wahkootowin* ethical relationships. We can use mutual support to help us figure out what a relationship demands of us, given the type of relationship and the needs and abilities of the parties. Reciprocity helps us understand relationships that seem to have a one-sided dependence relation. With attention to reciprocity, we can see why not every relationship has to be an exchange of material support. Reciprocity can

also help us understand when our relationships are failing, and in so doing help us understand the claims *wahkootowin* relations put on us. I argue that decency can be used to give an explanation of impermissibility in a *wahkootowin* ethics. To say that an action is impermissible is to say that doing it would be *indecent*. The question of how to establish what would be decent in a particular circumstance is a difficult one, but I think that the fourth characteristic, order, can help us understand what demands decency places on us.

Order functions as something of an 'ideal' against which to compare our actions and institutions. The smooth functioning of kinship relations is the product of order, and so once we understand what it is for a kinship relationship to function smoothly, we can refer to order to evaluate our relationships and institutions to see whether they meet the requirements of smooth functioning. What it means for a relationship to function smoothly is, obviously, deeply dependent on the nature of the relationship, the individuals involved in it, and so on. But attention to the needs and capacities of the related beings and the nature of the relationship can help orient our ethical deliberation toward an ideal of smooth functioning. That ideal is the purpose that order serves in a *wahkootowin* ethical system. This is only a quick outline of the *wahkootowin* ethics, and of course much more could be said on each of the principles and how they function to give us a comprehensive account of ethical life. But for our purposes here, this sketch should suffice.

Darwall and the Accountability Picture

One interesting approach to ethics in the anglophone world – for instance, by Stephen Darwall – is *second-personal* ethics. These views emphasize as central the idea that ethical obligations are primarily second-personal in nature, i.e., that they are owed by some agent to some other being. Darwall's analysis of obligation, which I call the 'accountability analysis', provides a theory of

obligation which can easily capture the directness and directedness of obligations I outlined above. However, the accountability analysis is not well-suited to explain our obligations to nonhuman creatures and the land. It leads to a picture of obligation that is fundamentally anthropocentric. So, this article is meant to explain the features of Darwall's view that are compatible with the *wahkootowin* view, and also to explain why his analysis of obligation is ultimately unable to account for what I consider vital (true!) claims of the *wahkootowin* ethical system.

There are two important features of second-personal ethical obligation that are well-suited to include beings that have been left out of most ethical deliberation. As such, they are also features of my interpretation of *wahkootowin* ethics. Like second-personal obligations, *wahkootowin*-based obligations are *direct*, i.e., that they hold between two agents without intermediaries[x], and they are *directed*, i.e., they are obligations *to some other* and not general obligations. An example that I take to be an undirected obligation would be something like "reduce suffering". This obligation is one that Darwall would call third-personal, I contend – there are some state of affairs, like suffering, that are bad. If we have an obligation to reduce suffering generally, the obligation in that situation is to change the state of affairs. This is an *agent-neutral* obligation. Instead of an obligation that holds between me and someone else, it is one that is supposed to give any agent a reason to act, without reference to their relationships to others.[xi] An undirected obligation means that there is no obligation *to* some other to reduce suffering.

My argument is that *wahkootowin* offers a way to get obligations of the appropriate kind – direct and directed – without falling prey to the anthropocentrism present in the accountability analysis of obligation. *Wahkootowin* obligations, as a result of their nature as kinship relations,

are both direct and directed. The key feature of the accountability analysis which results in anthropocentrism is the requirement for second-personal competence that Darwall demands in his picture of obligation. In the next section, I will explain why a requirement for second-personal competence results in problematic anthropocentrism, and why the attempts to include nonhuman creatures in second-personal ethics lapses back into anthropocentrism when it tries to hold on to the requirement for second-personal competence.

As a first pass at Darwall's picture of moral obligation as accountability, we can look to his chapter "Moral Obligation: Form and Substance" where he says that an argument can be made from "moral obligation's form as fundamental answerability to one another as representative persons."[xii] The idea here is that the basic nature of moral obligation has to do with others, and their ability to call us to account for our actions. Answerability is at the center of accountability – to be answerable to someone else is for them to have a claim on you to give an account of your actions. We often think, for instance, that parents are not answerable to their children. We implicitly endorse this idea when we accept "because I said so" as a legitimate answer to a child's question about why they can or cannot do something. Parents are not answerable to children, we might think, because children lack the right sort of abilities to legitimately demand answers from their parents.[xiii] On the other hand, there is an idea that a government only has the moral authority to constrain or demand the actions of its citizens if there is some mechanism through which that government can be held accountable – often, through democratic or legal structures which allow the citizens to force the government to explain, defend, and redress harms done by its actions.

The basic requirement to be a moral agent in Darwall's picture is to have what he calls *second-personal competence* – "whatever psychic competences are necessary to enter into

mutually accountable, interpersonal relationship."[xiv] The vital pieces of second-personal competence, for Darwall, are these: First, rational agency.[xv] Second, the ability to imaginatively project into some other's point of view.[xvi] Third, the capacity to make normative judgments, and to regulate one's own behaviour by such judgments.[xvii] The combination of these three capacities is what characterizes second-personal competence for the rest of this article. The idea is that someone is second-personally competent if they are capable of recognizing the demands others make on them, and that they make on others, and if they are capable of changing their behaviour in virtue of these demands.

As I understand it, Darwall's picture of obligation depends on accountability. So, for Darwall, x is obligated to y just in case y has the standing to hold x accountable for acting (or refraining from acting) in a certain way. I take it that both standing and holding accountable are necessary. If a creature could hold us accountable but lacks the standing to do so, then no obligation exists. Likewise, if the creature has standing but is utterly incapable of holding us accountable, then no obligation exists. If another creature with standing chooses not to hold us accountable, then no obligation exists – this, I take it, is how we explain the possibility of consenting to acts which would be immoral to commit without that consent. This is why, for example, it is not immoral for a surgeon to cut me open, even if the surgery is a failure or ends up causing me harm. It would be immoral for a burglar to cut me open, even if they do little lasting harm. Indeed, even if the burglar accidentally performed a perfect appendectomy, which unbeknownst to me I needed, it would be immoral of them to do so without my consent.

Darwall's view is that second-personal obligations are both direct and directed.[xviii] The argument that these obligations are directed is relatively simple – in virtue of their second-personal nature, these obligations are always directed at some other. It makes no sense to say that

I have an obligation *to you*, where the 'you' refers to no one. We might think that sometimes the "you" refers to an imagined person, or some composite body like a group, corporation, or city population. But even in these cases, the directedness of the obligation is clear – it's to another, whether the other in the case is a representative person, a group, or a concrete individual.

As for directedness, it is not clear that Darwall is committed to the idea that *all* obligations are direct. Nonetheless, I think that the basic case of a dyadic second-personal moral obligation *is* always direct. If I owe you some act, then I owe you that act directly, not through my owing the act to some other person. So, if I have an obligation to not harm my sister, then my obligation is to her and not my parents who might be happy that I treat her well. Rather, it is because I have an obligation *to my sister* to refrain from harming them that I ought to do so. This follows from the structure of second-personal obligations, especially the basic case of a dyadic[xix] obligation.

Having established the directness and directedness of Darwall's view, we can move on to some interpretive work. I want to explain why I think that Darwall's accountability analysis cannot keep the directness and directedness that I find so appealing about second-personal pictures of ethics when nonhuman creatures are considered objects of obligation. There is an obviously anthropocentric way to interpret Darwall's view, which I will call the 'literal' interpretation. If we interpret the phrase 'holding x accountable' in the strongest way possible, then we would say y needs to be able to use language to satisfy their side of the obligation relation. That is, it would only be possible for x to be obligated to y if y can articulate or communicate their intention to hold x accountable. Since we humans primarily communicate using language, and only understand human language[xx], it's clear that the literal interpretation of

Darwall's requirement is anthropocentric. Leaving aside the question of standing, on this view only humans could possibly hold one other accountable.

This is not a particularly plausible interpretation of Darwall's position, however, because it completely leaves out cases in which our being held accountable could be reasonably expected, but we are not actually called to account by anyone else. Clearly this less demanding kind of accountability is the kind that is at play in most normal situations. When I walk down the street, if I for some reason seriously consider blocking the street to another walker or restraining a stranger, I simply imagine and take as authoritative the fact that they would likely hold me accountable for impeding their progress down the street and that they have standing to do so. In these common cases, the expression of the intention to hold someone accountable is not explicit. We need an interpretation which accounts for the hypothetical nature of most of the accountability relations between people. After all, we do not refrain from engaging in immoral behaviour because someone has expressed their intent to hold us accountable for it in every case.

So let us abandon the literal interpretation of holding someone accountable in favor of a less explicit interpretation of that action, according to which we have a reasonable expectation that we would be held accountable by others. This is where the idea of a representative person comes back into the discussion. A representative person need not be someone who actually exists. Rather, it is an embodiment, in some sense, of the moral community. For Darwall, I take it that often actual persons *are* representative persons, who speak on behalf of the moral community. But I leave open the possibility that a representative person might be a hypothetical person. Darwall's requirement for imaginative capacities as a part of second-personal competence leads me to think that these capacities might be used to conjure up a hypothetical representative person, at least some of the time. The idea is that there are some things which are

legitimately claimed by *any* being that possesses second-personal competence. Since I have second-personal competence, I can use my imaginative capacities to understand what I owe any arbitrary being that also has second-personal competence.

Now we have a picture of obligation that looks something like this: x is obligated to y just in case y has the standing to hold x accountable, and x has reason to believe that y would hold them accountable for acting in some way even if y never, in fact, expresses their intention to hold x accountable before the act takes place. Hence, I know without blocking the doorway into the hospital that I would be legitimately held accountable for doing so. I therefore recognize that it would be immoral for me to unnecessarily restrain someone else's freedom of movement without good reason. Or, as another example, it would be immoral for me to knowingly give false directions to a stranger, even when I know I'd never be caught, and never see that person again.

Darwall's discussion of representative persons, and the requirement for imaginative projection in second-personal competence, both open the door for this less demanding sort of interpretation. It is a less demanding interpretation than the 'literal' interpretation above because it does not require explicit statement of an intent to hold someone accountable – the imaginative capacities of the agent can take the place of these explicit declarations in many cases. Because it is less demanding, this interpretation is more plausible than the literal interpretation. It matches more closely our actual experience of moral life, which is not one in which we spend much time making or receiving declarations of an intent to hold each other accountable for this or that action. However, I argue that even this less demanding version of Darwall's analysis of obligation cannot account for our obligations to nonhuman beings.

The reason that even the less demanding version of Darwall's analysis cannot account for our obligations to nonhuman beings is because the requirement that y hold x accountable

unavoidably excludes nonhuman beings who *should* be included. Even in the less demanding version of the accountability analysis of obligation, it is required that *y* hypothetically hold *x* accountable. The challenge, then, is to come up with a picture of holding *x* accountable that can include all the relevant nonhuman beings. First off, it cannot be a picture that involves human language. After all, nonhuman beings do not use human language. Human language is certainly the most common mechanism for articulating that *y* wants to hold *x* accountable, but even in the most plausible cases, like orcas or corvids, human language is not a possible mechanism for holding another accountable.

The next solution, which I take from Darwall himself, is to focus on *reactive attitudes*.[xxi] Examples of reactive attitudes are things like indignation or resentment. It seems plausible to think that indignation or resentment can express an intention to hold someone accountable for their acting in a way that produces the relevant reactive attitude. So, if we can infer from their actions that orcas or corvids can feel resentment or indignation toward us, we can infer that they intend to hold us accountable for our actions.[xxii] And indeed, it seems that we often do this with humans. It's hardly an unfamiliar situation to recognize through nonverbal clues that a person has taken offense to your actions.

The reactive attitudes approach manages to explain how we might be held accountable by some animals. And this is not nothing – it definitely serves to account for our intuition that we owe something to what are sometimes called 'higher animals'. But the view that I want to defend does not limit our ethical obligations to higher animals, whatever one takes that term to denote. Rather, I want to defend the idea that there is something literally true about the idea that we have obligations to rivers and ecosystems, plants and all the animals. While some animals can be captured by the reactive attitude approach, it certainly won't work for other candidate beings. At

this point, the reader can choose which they think is the most plausible candidate for ethical consideration. The point stands that for many animals, plants, and probably all ecosystems, reactive attitudes cannot be the mechanism for accountability. It seems almost incoherent to say that a river is indignant; even if not incoherent, it would be a kind of indignance that is so different as to make us (almost) completely insensitive to it. It would therefore not function as a mechanism for accountability.

The Trustee Model

One attempt to explain how we might include nonverbal and even nonhuman beings into the moral world comes from Tim Scanlon's book *What We Owe to Each Other*. While Scanlon would not have characterized his approach as a second-personal one, especially since this book predates Darwall's use of the term, I think that the contractualism in Scanlon's book is a natural fit for the theory of obligation as accountability. Scanlon's view is that his contractualism says an action is right when the principle on which it is based could not be reasonably refused by others.[xxiii] I think the attention to whether others accept or reject the principles for our actions is closely related, though of course not exactly the same in all respects, to the picture of obligation that we have seen from Darwall – it is concerned with consideration of others as

I'll call this approach is called the 'trustee model', and it works basically how it sounds like it would: a human takes up the position of trustee for the nonverbal or nonhuman being, and advocates on their behalf.[xxiv] The trustee holding us accountable stands in the for nonhuman being holding us accountable. An example of this would be wildlife conservancy and stewardship initiatives: in these cases, human beings advocate and act as trustees for the nonhuman beings under their care. Humans are the ones who hold us to account for our actions that affect the creatures under their care.

There are a couple things to say about this right away. First, I don't want to argue that there is nothing valuable about reminders from other humans that we have obligations to nonhuman beings. Elders, friends, and other members of the human community can *and should* remind us, when we need a reminder, that we have obligations to others. They do this in the case of humans, too. Children might need instruction on their obligations to the nonhuman beings around them as they learn, which they get both from interactions with other beings on the land and from human teachers and kin. In that sense, human trustees are necessary and fulfill an important role in communities.

The reason the trustee model fails to properly capture our obligations to nonhuman beings is not because it is or would be bad for humans to act as reminders or advocates for nonhuman beings. The reason the trustee model fails is because it depends unavoidably on humans to work. If the mechanism of our obligation is mediated by humans, as in the trustee model, then we end up with a theory that says that, were there no other humans, we could have no obligations to nonhuman beings. So, it is safe to say that the trustee model is fundamentally anthropocentric. It is an indirect mechanism of obligation, and the obligation that we have to other beings is not indirect. We have an obligation to other beings and the land, not via some other person but via our kinship relations to those beings.

Wahkootowin

At the beginning of this piece, I mentioned that *wahkootowin* as a concept is a natural consequence of the Métis nation's close relationship with the beings of their homeland. While this is not the place to defend the claim in detail, I want to give my explanation of why we have *wahkootowin* relations with nonhuman beings. In this, I do not pretend to explain how other Métis thinkers ground these relations. I only want to present my understanding of them, to give

one picture of our relationships to other beings. I draw my understanding of kinship from Marshall Sahlins' book *What Kinship Is – And Is Not.* In that book, Sahlins defines kinship as "mutuality of being".[xxv] He says that mutuality of being means that two beings are "intrinsic to one another's existence".[xxvi] My interpretation of what it is to be intrinsic to another's existence is what makes it true that we have *wahkootowin* relationships to other, nonhuman beings.

First, if I depend on another being for my existence, then that being is intrinsic to my existence. Second, I think that if I cannot be fully understood without reference to another, then that other is intrinsic to my existence. So, we can say that my parents are kin; to understand *who* I am, one must understand that I stand in relations to them. This is also true of non-biologically related humans too: one's spouse is (typically) an integral part of one's life and identity. A complete description of me without my spouse is simply not a complete description of *who I am*.

The main idea of Sahlins's view, I think, comes from the titles of the chapters of his book: first "What Kinship Is – Culture" and second "What Kinship Is Not – Biology".[xxvii] Kinship is not merely a record of biological inheritance. Biological facts are important, certainly – my biological parents are *in some sense* intrinsic to my existence, since without them I would not exist. But they may or may not be intrinsic to it *now* – they may or may not currently be kin. Likewise, I did not have a *wahkootowin* relationship to the land on which I currently reside until I moved here – I grew up in the territory of the Ktunaxa people, and their land was the land intrinsic to my being during my formative years. Now, I have less of a connection to that land, and my more pressing *wahkootowin* obligations have to do with the traditional territories of the Lək̓ʷəŋən (Songhees and Esquimalt) peoples.

The formulation that Sahlins uses – that kinship is mutuality of being – is not a Métis formulation of the notion of kinship. But it is an explanation for what Métis thinkers say about

wahkootowin: that it is a connection that "drew the land, creatures, and people together as spiritual relatives with all of creation".[xxviii] That "at one time, from our place it meant the whole of creation. And our teachings taught us that all of creation is related and interconnected to all things within it.[xxix] Precisely what draws together the land, creatures, and people is not stated explicitly in Macdougall, nor in Campbell's explanation. My candidate explanation is that the facts of our dependence on other creatures to maintain the lifegiving functions of the land and other beings, and the necessity of referring to these particular other creatures in a full description of our selves that draws us together "as spiritual relatives with all of creation", as Macdougall puts it.[xxx]

There are several reasons for preferring *wahkootowin* relations as a foundation for obligations to the accountability analysis we saw above. First, kinship relations take the right sort of directed form. They can explain our obligations *to* other beings. Second, kinship relations are direct. They do not depend on intermediaries, like the trustee model. With attention to these two facts, we can see that *wahkootowin* ethics not only retains the attractive features of the second-personal view of ethics, but it is also able to include other beings that also should be within the domain of morality. *Wahkootowin* allows us to capture the obligations that we have to nonhuman beings and to land as well as to other humans.

Conclusion

The purpose of this essay is not to argue against Darwall's view on its own terms. I do not hope to have shown any internal inconsistency, any fallacy, or any other error in argumentation. Perhaps there are some! But my purpose is instead to show that, if we accept the (eminently plausible) idea that we humans can and do have obligations to nonhuman beings and to the land, Darwall's analysis of obligation, and ones like it, are not fit to account for those

obligations. These views are too attached to anthropocentric notions of cognitive capacities and accountability that leave them unable to account for nonhuman beings. They either cannot include such beings at all, or have to give up the directness, which I take to be a key feature of the relationships that humans have to their nonhuman kin. We need a different theory of obligation to explain those cases.

I argued that the Cree/Métis concept of *wahkootowin* can provide the beginning of such a theory, because kinship relationships also have the attractive features of Darwall's second-personal theory. They are direct and directed, and so if we take my ethical interpretation of *wahkootowin*, we can preserve the attractive features of the second-personal picture without accidentally excluding a large part of the ethical domain. When we interpret the notion of kinship as "mutuality of being", I argued that we are able to explain why nonhuman beings should be included. They should be included because they sustain the conditions necessary for our existence, and because a full understanding of a human being is impossible without appeal to the land and other beings that make their life possible. Therefore, the nonhuman beings and land around us are intrinsic to our existence. We are what we are, inescapably in virtue of the nonhuman beings and land around us. *Wahkootowin* captures the way that more than just humans are intrinsic to our being, and the obligations that come along with those relations.

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[i] Macdougall, *One of the Family*; Saunders and Dubois, *Métis Politics and Governance in Canada*.

[ii] Saunders and Dubois, *Métis Politics and Governance in Canada,* 42; Macdougall, "Wahkootowin", 433; Teillet, *The North-West Is Our Mother, 469-70*; Gaudry, *Kaa-Tipeyimishoyaahk - 'We Are Those Who Own Ourselves': A Political History of Métis Self-Determination in the North-West, 1830-1870*, 78-9; 143-7.

[iii] Darwall, "Moral Obligation: Form and Substance", 42.

[iv] Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other,* 182-7.

[v] Macdougall, "Wahkootowin", 433.

[vi] Ibid., 432-3.

[vii] Campbell, "We Need to Return to the Principles of Wahkotowin."

[viii] Todd, "Fish, Kin and Hope", 106-7.

[ix] Macdougall, *One of the Family,* 8.

[x] In the basic case. I think that the generalization from individual agents to community-agents probably merits some discussion (it's not entailed from what has come before now), but it does not seem too problematic to make the argument.

[xi] Darwall, *The Second-Person Standpoint*, 9.

[xii] Darwall, "Moral Obligation: Form and Substance", 42.

[xiii] This is not absolute, of course – children do sometimes have standing, depending on the context. I do not want to endorse this style of parenting here, either. I only use this example as one with which most readers will be familiar.

[xiv] Darwall, "Moral Obligation: Form and Substance", 46-7.

[xv] Ibid., 47.

[xvi] Ibid.

[xvii] Ibid.

[xviii] Darwall, *The Second-Person Standpoint,* 9.

[xix] That is, between two people. In this context, this means it's both direct and singular. I take that to be the basic case of both kinship and obligation, here.

[xx] I am not a linguist nor a philosopher of language, but I want to leave space here because it seems to me like complex communication between other species could be counted as language, at least in some cases – I'm thinking here of orcas, who have complex cultures and pass down information from one generation to another, apparently through some means other than genetics.

[xxi] Darwall, *The Second-Person Standpoint,* 70.

[xxii] This may be even more liberal than Darwall would prefer – it seems that reactive attitudes might require more recognizably human cognitive capacities than I indicate here. If that's so, then his view is *even more* restrictive, and reactive attitudes are clearly not going to solve the anthropocentrism problem. In this section, I grant perhaps too relaxed a picture of the capacities needed for reactive attitudes, yet I think even that relaxed picture fails.

[xxiii] Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other,* 195.

[xxiv] Ibid., 182-3.

[xxv] Sahlins, *What Kinship Is-and Is Not,* 2.

[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii] Ibid., 1; 62.

[xxviii] Macdougall, *One of the Family,* 132.

[xxix] Campbell, "We Need to Return to the Principles of Wahkotowin", 5.

[xxx] Macdougall, *One of the Family,* 132.