<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	xmlns:georss="http://www.georss.org/georss" xmlns:geo="http://www.w3.org/2003/01/geo/wgs84_pos#" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Formal Philosophy</title>
	<atom:link href="http://fphil.org/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://fphil.org</link>
	<description>logic, mathematics, and philosophy</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 12:58:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.com/</generator>
<cloud domain='fphil.org' port='80' path='/?rsscloud=notify' registerProcedure='' protocol='http-post' />

	<atom:link rel="search" type="application/opensearchdescription+xml" href="http://fphil.org/osd.xml" title="Formal Philosophy" />
	<atom:link rel='hub' href='http://fphil.org/?pushpress=hub'/>
		<item>
		<title>Bobzien: Higher-Order Vagueness</title>
		<link>http://fphil.org/2013/05/15/bobzien/</link>
		<comments>http://fphil.org/2013/05/15/bobzien/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 12:58:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Yang Liu</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vagueness]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fphil.org/?p=1219</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[KRIPKE CENTER LECTURE Kripke Semantics for Columnar Higher-Order Vagueness Susanne Bobzien (Yale University) Thursday, May 16, 4:15-6:15pm Room 5307, GC Abstract. Hierarchical higher-order vagueness leads to incoherence when it is used as a means to avoid a sharp boundary in the Sorites paradox (cf. Sainsbury 1990, Wright 1992, Shapiro 2006). The challenge is to provide [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=fphil.org&#038;blog=29873607&#038;post=1219&#038;subd=fphil&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://fphil.org/2013/05/15/bobzien/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
		<media:content url="http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/eeee07fda705ee612a2d9d38aac141aa?s=96&#38;d=http%3A%2F%2Fs0.wp.com%2Fi%2Fmu.gif&#38;r=G" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">Yang</media:title>
		</media:content>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Tamar Lando: The topology of gunk</title>
		<link>http://fphil.org/2013/05/08/tamar-lando-the-topology-of-gunk/</link>
		<comments>http://fphil.org/2013/05/08/tamar-lando-the-topology-of-gunk/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 03:24:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ignacio Ojea</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fphil.org/?p=1209</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[NY PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC GROUP The topology of gunk Tamar Lando (Columbia University) Monday, May 13th, 4 to 6 PM 2nd floor seminar room, Philosophy Department, NYU (5 Washington Place). Abstract. Space as we typically conceive of it in mathematics and physics is composed of dimensionless points. Over the years, however, some have denied that points, or [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=fphil.org&#038;blog=29873607&#038;post=1209&#038;subd=fphil&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://fphil.org/2013/05/08/tamar-lando-the-topology-of-gunk/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
		<media:content url="http://0.gravatar.com/avatar/6a9205f76cae1b756ba5e36341c787c3?s=96&#38;d=http%3A%2F%2Fs0.wp.com%2Fi%2Fmu.gif&#38;r=G" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">ignacioojea</media:title>
		</media:content>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Gaifman: Epistemic and Ontological Problems Concerning Mathematics</title>
		<link>http://fphil.org/2013/04/27/gaifman-harvard-mit/</link>
		<comments>http://fphil.org/2013/04/27/gaifman-harvard-mit/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 27 Apr 2013 18:54:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Yang Liu</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Workshop]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ontology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[philosophy of mathematics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[set theory]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[truth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ZFC]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fphil.org/?p=1192</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[HARVARD/MIT LOGIC SEMINAR Epistemic and Ontological Problems Concerning Mathematics Haim Gaifman (Columbia University) Tuesday, April 30, 2013, at 4:15 PM Fong Auditorium (Boylston Hall 110), Harvard University Abstract. Philosophy of mathematics is confronted with two major questions: (i) How do we come to know mathematical propositions? (ii) What is the nature of mathematical truth? Attempts [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=fphil.org&#038;blog=29873607&#038;post=1192&#038;subd=fphil&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://fphil.org/2013/04/27/gaifman-harvard-mit/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
	
		<media:content url="http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/eeee07fda705ee612a2d9d38aac141aa?s=96&#38;d=http%3A%2F%2Fs0.wp.com%2Fi%2Fmu.gif&#38;r=G" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">Yang</media:title>
		</media:content>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Hamkins: The theory of infinite games, with examples, including infinite chess</title>
		<link>http://fphil.org/2013/04/22/hamkins-the-theory-of-infinite-games-with-examples-including-infinite-chess/</link>
		<comments>http://fphil.org/2013/04/22/hamkins-the-theory-of-infinite-games-with-examples-including-infinite-chess/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 02:23:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Yang Liu</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[chess]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[games]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[infinite games]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[paradoxes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[set theory]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fphil.org/?p=1190</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[YESHIVA MATH/PHIL CLUB The theory of infinite games, with examples, including infinite chess Joel David Hamkins (CUNY) Tuesday, April 30, 2013 5:45 pm Furst Hall, Amsterdam Ave. &#38; 185th Street, Yeshiva University Abstract. I will give a general introduction to the theory of infinite games, suitable for mathematicians and philosophers. What does it mean to [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=fphil.org&#038;blog=29873607&#038;post=1190&#038;subd=fphil&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://fphil.org/2013/04/22/hamkins-the-theory-of-infinite-games-with-examples-including-infinite-chess/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
		<media:content url="http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/eeee07fda705ee612a2d9d38aac141aa?s=96&#38;d=http%3A%2F%2Fs0.wp.com%2Fi%2Fmu.gif&#38;r=G" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">Yang</media:title>
		</media:content>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Hellman: On Resolving the Set-Theoretic and Semantic Paradoxes</title>
		<link>http://fphil.org/2013/04/18/hellman-on-resolving-the-set-theoretic-and-semantic-paradoxes/</link>
		<comments>http://fphil.org/2013/04/18/hellman-on-resolving-the-set-theoretic-and-semantic-paradoxes/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Apr 2013 14:13:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ignacio Ojea</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[metaphysics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fphil.org/?p=1174</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[NY PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC GROUP On Resolving the Set-Theoretic and Semantic Paradoxes Geoff Hellman (University of Minnesota) 4-6pm, Monday, April 22nd 2nd floor seminar room, NYU (5 Washington Place) Abstract. Our main goals are, first, to describe how modal structuralism resolves the set-theoretic paradoxes, concentrating on the Burali-Forti paradox, and then to note a close connection [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=fphil.org&#038;blog=29873607&#038;post=1174&#038;subd=fphil&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://fphil.org/2013/04/18/hellman-on-resolving-the-set-theoretic-and-semantic-paradoxes/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
		<media:content url="http://0.gravatar.com/avatar/6a9205f76cae1b756ba5e36341c787c3?s=96&#38;d=http%3A%2F%2Fs0.wp.com%2Fi%2Fmu.gif&#38;r=G" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">ignacioojea</media:title>
		</media:content>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Suppes Lectures</title>
		<link>http://fphil.org/2013/04/16/suppes-lecture/</link>
		<comments>http://fphil.org/2013/04/16/suppes-lecture/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2013 14:07:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Yang Liu</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fphil.org/?p=1162</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[An interdisciplinary program followed by a reception celebrating the academic contributions to psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience by Patrick Suppes, Ph.D. &#8217;50 GSAS Lucie Stern Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus at Stanford University Introduction David Krantz (Psychology) Patrick Suppes Speakers Christopher Peacocke (Philosophy) Niall Bolger  (Psychology) Mark Churchland (Neuroscience) Thursday, May 2, 2013, 2 p.m. Program, 4:15 p.m. Reception at Faculty [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=fphil.org&#038;blog=29873607&#038;post=1162&#038;subd=fphil&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://fphil.org/2013/04/16/suppes-lecture/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
		<media:content url="http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/eeee07fda705ee612a2d9d38aac141aa?s=96&#38;d=http%3A%2F%2Fs0.wp.com%2Fi%2Fmu.gif&#38;r=G" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">Yang</media:title>
		</media:content>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Dogramaci: The Varieties of Validity Worth Wanting</title>
		<link>http://fphil.org/2013/04/04/dogramac/</link>
		<comments>http://fphil.org/2013/04/04/dogramac/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Apr 2013 14:05:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Yang Liu</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[decision]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[inference]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Savage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[validity]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fphil.org/?p=1144</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[COLUMBIA PHILOSOPHY The Varieties of Validity Worth Wanting Sinan Dogramaci  (Texas) Thursday, April 11th, 4:10 PM 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University Abstract. I ask whether the validity of a Modus Ponens inference is any part of the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good or valuable inference. I argue for the following. [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=fphil.org&#038;blog=29873607&#038;post=1144&#038;subd=fphil&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://fphil.org/2013/04/04/dogramac/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
		<media:content url="http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/eeee07fda705ee612a2d9d38aac141aa?s=96&#38;d=http%3A%2F%2Fs0.wp.com%2Fi%2Fmu.gif&#38;r=G" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">Yang</media:title>
		</media:content>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Hájek: Staying Regular?</title>
		<link>http://fphil.org/2013/03/30/hajek-staying-regular/</link>
		<comments>http://fphil.org/2013/03/30/hajek-staying-regular/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 30 Mar 2013 13:00:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Yang Liu</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Workshop]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bayesianism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[probability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rationality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regularity]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fphil.org/?p=1104</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[COLUMBIA FORMAL PHILOSOPHY WORKSHOP Staying Regular? Alan Hájek (Australian National University) Thursday, April 4, 2013, 4:00 – 5:30 PM 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University Abstract. ‘Regularity’ conditions provide nice bridges between the various ‘box’/‘diamond’ modalities and various notions of probability. Schematically, they have the form: If X is possible, then the probability of X is positive [&#8230;]<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=fphil.org&#038;blog=29873607&#038;post=1104&#038;subd=fphil&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://fphil.org/2013/03/30/hajek-staying-regular/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
		<media:content url="http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/eeee07fda705ee612a2d9d38aac141aa?s=96&#38;d=http%3A%2F%2Fs0.wp.com%2Fi%2Fmu.gif&#38;r=G" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">Yang</media:title>
		</media:content>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Butterfield: Morningside Story</title>
		<link>http://fphil.org/2013/03/30/butterfiel/</link>
		<comments>http://fphil.org/2013/03/30/butterfiel/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 30 Mar 2013 12:34:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Yang Liu</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[games]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[logic]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fphil.org/?p=1136</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[COLUMBIA PHILOSOPHY NAGEL LECTURE Morningside Story: Light, Matter and Ernest Nagel Jeremy Butterfield (Cambridge) Tuesday, April 2, 2013, at 4:10 PM 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University Reception to follow Filed under: Events Tagged: games, logic<img alt="" border="0" src="http://stats.wordpress.com/b.gif?host=fphil.org&#038;blog=29873607&#038;post=1136&#038;subd=fphil&#038;ref=&#038;feed=1" width="1" height="1" />]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://fphil.org/2013/03/30/butterfiel/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
	
		<media:content url="http://2.gravatar.com/avatar/eeee07fda705ee612a2d9d38aac141aa?s=96&#38;d=http%3A%2F%2Fs0.wp.com%2Fi%2Fmu.gif&#38;r=G" medium="image">
			<media:title type="html">Yang</media:title>
		</media:content>
	</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
